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In this thesis, I argue that Dominic Gregory (2004) and Stephen Yablo’s (1993) error 
theoretic accounts provide the most compelling reason to think that the imagination will guide us 
towards knowledge of possibilities. In the first chapter, I take up both Dominic Gregory (2004) and 
Stephen Yablo’s (1993) error theoretic accounts. The error theoretic view picks out a specific sense 
of imagining as that which will justify our modal beliefs. First, I argue that both Gregory and Yablo’s 
accounts are epistemically circular and in need of revision. I proceed to argue that after revision, 
both accounts provide tenable error theoretic reason to think that the imagination will guide us 
towards knowledge of possibilities.   
In the second chapter, I present Peter Kung (2010) and Dominic Gregory’s (2019) imagistic 
accounts. Contra the error theoretic view, the imagistic position holds that there is something about 
the imagistic medium of certain imaginings that makes them suitable guides to knowledge of 
possibilities. In the third chapter, I investigate two cases which probe the adequacy of the various 
accounts I have examined. While each of the accounts provides a successful evaluation of these 
cases, it turns out that they all rely on the same error theoretic move in order to do so. The error 
theoretic accounts predictably offer the strongest defense of that move. Since these cases probe how 
the imagination fares as a modal epistemological tool, we have reason to think that error theoretic 
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Upon initial consideration, using the imagination as a guide to knowledge of possibility is a 
familiar act. For example, suppose that I am in a situation in which I must move a sofa out of my 
house. In doing so, I might wonder if it is possible to fit the sofa through my front door. I may try 
to answer this question by imagining the sofa next to the door or imagining rotating the sofa to 
mentally analyze its size relative to the door from various angles. These imaginings will then 
determine whether I attempt to push the sofa through the door or deem doing so impossible and 
opt for a different solution. In this way, our everyday considerations reveal that most of us do seem 
to rely upon our imaginations as guides to what is possible.  
However, if we believe that the imagination can provide us knowledge of possibilities,1 we 
are obliged to account for the fact that we also seem to be able to imagine impossible things. For 
example, it seems as though we can imagine that the claim ‘water is H20’ is false. Since water is one 
and the same as H20, imagining the falsity of ‘water is H20’ is to imagine the falsity of something 
that is necessarily the case, which is to imagine an impossibility.  We might then wonder how we can 
be sure which of the things that we imagine are in fact possible. If our imaginings are going to serve 
as any sort of justification for our thoughts about possibility, we must explain which imaginings are 
reliable guides and which are not.  
While imagination can lead us astray, this alone does not suffice to discard it as a guide to 
knowledge of possibilities. Our perceptual faculties likewise lead us astray at times. It is certainly not 
the case that I only enjoy visual experiences that accurately represent the world. However, I am 
justified in taking my visual experiences to be guides to knowledge of the world around me because 
                                               
1 What we really do amounts to something more like relying on our imaginings to provide justification for our thoughts 
on possibilities. If I think that X possible, I imagine X and I take my imagining of X to justify my thought that X is 
possible. In this way, we take our imaginings to boost the epistemic status of our modal intuitions. In this thesis, I will 
speak of the imagination ‘guiding us towards knowledge of possibilities’ as a shorthand for this longer explanation of the 




I have a grasp on how my perceptual errors arise. For example, suppose that I mistakenly take 
myself to see a dog in the distance when in fact I am only looking at an oddly shaped log. Once I 
find out that I have made this error, I will likely have easy epistemic access to its source (e.g. I might 
notice that my glasses are smudged, notice that I have an eye infection, etc.) Knowing how our 
perceptual errors arise justifies us in thinking that what our visual experiences display is accurate so 
long as we have reason to think that those visual experiences lack known error-causing features.  
In contrast, we are comparatively uninformed about the etiology of our modal errors. We are 
thus less capable of recognizing when our imaginings either have or lack certain error-causing 
features, precisely because we are not clear as to what those error-causing features are. Once we 
recognize the factors that lead to modal error, we can be more certain in ascribing possibility to the 
contents of our imaginings when we have reason to think that those features are absent.  
In this thesis, I argue that error theoretic accounts of the imagination offer the most 
compelling explanation of our modal errors. They thus provide the strongest reason to think that 
our imaginings can serve as trustworthy, albeit fallible, guides to knowledge of possibilities. Error 
theoretic accounts pick out a specific sense of imagining as that which will justify our modal beliefs, 
and they take modal errors to occur when we are mistaken about what we imagine. This is to say 
that I can mistakenly take myself to imagine either an impossible X or a modally indeterminate X in 
a way that I take to justify my modal beliefs when I in fact only imagine X1 in that way. We can thus 
explain my modal error in ascribing possibility to X by pointing out that I was in fact imagining X1.  
In the first chapter, I canvass Dominic Gregory’s (2004) and Stephen Yablo’s (1993) error 
theoretic accounts. I argue that both accounts require revision in order to be epistemically non-
circular. Next, I argue that each account regains epistemic legitimacy once supplemented with 
Ichikawa and Jarvis’ (2012) conceptual entailments framework. I proceed to argue that even though 




positive view. I conclude that after revision, both Gregory and Yablo’s accounts provide tenable 
error theoretic reason to think that the imagination will guide us towards knowledge of possibilities.  
Error theoretic accounts contrast with what I call ‘imagistic accounts.’ On an imagistic 
account, there is something special about the imagistic content of certain imaginings that justifies 
our modal beliefs. Further, the imagistic view holds that it’s not the case that I can be mistaken 
about what I imagine (contrary to the error theoretic positions). When I imagine X, I in fact imagine 
X, and I have reason to think that my imagining justifies my modal beliefs in case the imagistic 
content of my imagining has the requisite good-making features. I thus make modal errors when I 
fail to recognize that my imaginings lack those features. I present Peter Kung’s (2010) and Dominic 
Gregory’s (2019) imagistic accounts in the second chapter.  
 In the third chapter, I investigate two cases which probe the adequacy of the various 
accounts I have examined. A successful account of the imagination needs to produce correct 
judgements about these cases. The first case is a proposition about whose modal status we are 
unsure and the other is an image that depicts an impossibility. I evaluate how all four accounts 
handle each case and argue that the error theoretic accounts handle both cases better than the 
imagistic accounts. Since these cases probe how the imagination fares as a modal epistemological 
tool, we have reason to think that error theoretic accounts of the imagination are best equipped to 
guide us towards knowledge of possibilities. 
 I conclude by questioning several of the assumptions on which Gregory and Yablo’s error 
theoretic accounts rest. While we can push back on those assumptions, I argue that none of the 
objections at hand undermine the accounts in question. Instead, I take each error theoretic line of 
reasoning to remain a tenable means of explaining modal error that is well-suited to help us to feel 





CHAPTER I: ERROR THEORETIC ACCOUNTS 
We have already seen that the imagination is so liberal as to facilitate our imagining 
impossible things. A modal epistemological account of the imagination thus needs to make a cut 
between imaginings whose contents are possible and imaginings whose contents are not. Error 
theoretic accounts make this cut by picking out a specific sense of imagining as that which will 
justify our modal beliefs.2  We have reason to think that a sense of imagining will do so if 
impossibilities turn out to be unimaginable in that sense. If impossibilities are unimaginable in a 
certain sense, then we will be justified in ascribing possibility to what we can imagine in that sense. 
The project thus becomes to pick out which constraints we need to place on our imaginative abilities 
in order to characterize a sense of imagining on which impossibilities will be unimaginable.  
 The error theoretic accounts that I defend in this chapter adopt this strategy albeit in 
different ways. Dominic Gregory (2004) introduces a line of reasoning that constrains our 
imaginative abilities by requiring us to imagine propositions under suppositions. According to 
Gregory, impossible propositions will be unimaginable under certain suppositions and it is 
establishing this constraint that gives us reason to think that propositions that are imaginable under 
the suppositions in question will be possible. In contrast, Stephen Yablo (1993) argues that we are 
justified in ascribing possibility to a given proposition only if we can imagine a possible world of 
which that proposition is true. He thus makes the cut by constraining the set of imagined possible 
worlds that justify our beliefs in possibility.  
 In this chapter, I argue that both Gregory and Yablo’s error theories preserve the 
imagination as a fallible guide to knowledge of possibility even when confronted with well-founded 
critique. In Section I, I argue that Peter Kung’s (2016) first objection to Gregory’s error theoretic 
characterization of unshakeable imaginability as a guide to knowledge of possibility fails because 
                                               




Kung misinterprets Gregory’s line of reasoning when forming his objection. First, I reconstruct 
Gregory’s conception of unshakeable imaginability. In doing so, I underline that in order to get 
unshakeable imaginability off the ground, Gregory must provide reason to think that impossibilities 
will not be unshakeably imaginable. I then present Kung’s objection, in which he argues that there 
are certain a posteriori impossibilities that remain unshakeably imaginable and thus defeat our reason 
for thinking that unshakeable imaginability will be a guide to knowledge of possibility.  
I proceed to argue that Kung’s objection succeeds on a misinterpretation of Gregory’s 
method. I then explain how Gregory’s method in fact functions and reevaluate Kung’s objection. 
Next, I argue that Kung would object to the correct interpretation of Gregory’s method on the basis 
of what he calls ‘modal conclusions first’ reasoning. According to this objection, Gregory can only 
say that certain propositions are unshakeably imaginable by rigging the imagination to conform to 
his antecedent modal conclusions. I endorse the objection and conclude that Gregory’s view is guilty 
of epistemic circularity.  
In Section II, I introduce Ichikawa and Jarvis’ (2012) characterization of conceptual 
entailment as a guide to modal knowledge and argue that supplementing Gregory’s view with it can 
save the unshakeable imaginability line of reasoning from being epistemically circular. First, I 
introduce Ichikawa and Jarvis’ notion of having a rational commitment to infer in imagination. In 
doing so, I underline the close parallel that they take the imagination to have with belief. Then, I 
show how Ichikawa and Jarvis argue that certain rational commitments to infer correspond to what 
they characterize as conceptual entailment relations. I proceed to explicate how they take our 
judgements of necessity to result from our recognition of certain conceptual entailment relations.  
In Section III, I apply Ichikawa and Jarvis’ method to one of Gregory’s cases in order to 
show that recognizing necessity relations by way of recognizing conceptual entailments allows the 




a tenable error theoretic view so long as we amend it with Ichikawa and Jarvis’ conceptual 
entailment framework. I conclude by explicating how once we have reason to think that 
impossibilities are not unshakeably imaginable, we have reason to think that propositions that are 
unshakeably imaginable will be possible.  
In Section IV, I argue that Stephen Yablo’s (1993) error theoretic account is likewise subject 
to Kung’s ‘modal conclusions first’ objection. I first summarize Yablo’s view and outline the sense 
of imagining that he takes to be modally salient. I then explicate the line of reasoning on which 
Yablo explains modal error. I proceed to raise Kung’s ‘modal conclusions first’ objection to that line 
of reasoning and argue that the objection succeeds. I then argue that Yablo’s view can likewise be 
supplemented by Ichikawa and Jarvis’ conceptual entailments framework in order to avoid being 
epistemically circular.  
In Section V, I head off the objection that if both Gregory and Yablo avoid epistemic 
circularity only by appealing to Ichikawa and Jarvis’ conceptual entailment framework, we might be 
better off adopting Ichikawa and Jarvis’ positive view over either of theirs. I argue, contra this line of 
reasoning, that Ichikawa and Jarvis’ positive view, even if successful, is not a view on which the 
imagination is a guide to modal knowledge. In doing so, I argue that we need not employ our 
imagination in order to determine whether a proposition is possible on Ichikawa and Jarvis’ positive 
view. Given that the project at hand is to determine whether the imagination can be a guide to 
knowledge of possibilities, I conclude that we are better off adopting either Gregory or Yablo’s 
revised error theoretic views.  
In Section VI, I head off the subsequent objection that if Ichikawa and Jarvis’ positive view 
relies upon conceptual entailments and does not employ the imagination, then we might think that 
Gregory and Yablo’s lines of reasoning will likewise no longer employ the imagination once revised. 




the respective accounts appeal. I take the conceptual entailments to which both Gregory and Yablo 
appeal to be of a different type than those to which Ichikawa and Jarvis appeal in their positive view. 
This allows the former two accounts to preserve the imagination as a modal epistemological tool 
while the latter positive view cannot. I conclude that since our project is to determine whether the 
imagination will be a guide to knowledge of possibilities, we ought to endorse either Gregory or 
Yablo’s error theoretic account of it.  
Before proceeding, it is necessary to note that both Gregory and Yablo pick out a sense of 
‘imagine’ that is modally salient and contrasts with imagining full stop. From here on, I will refer to 
the modally salient sense of ‘imagine’ as m-imagining and the full stop, non-modally salient sense(s) 
of ‘imagine’ as fs-imagining. Since Gregory and Yablo pick out different senses of imagining as the 
modally salient one, I will indicate which sense of imagining is m-imagining on each account.  
Section I: Gregory (2004): 
I.A: Gregory’s View:  
 Gregory (2004) defends the imagination as a guide to knowledge of possibilities by arguing 
that we are justified in taking a proposition to be possible when it is unshakeably imaginable (330). 
Thus a proposition is m-imaginable in case it is unshakeably imaginable. A proposition is 
unshakeably imaginable when it is fs-imaginable under “every correct, accessible and non-modal 
supposition about what is actually the case (331).” According to Gregory, an accessible proposition 
is a proposition whose truth value we would know in case we were situated in the right way (331). 
For example ‘4+5=9,’ and ‘George Washington was the first President of the United States’ are both 
accessible. Gregory takes an accessible proposition to be a correct one in case it is actually true (331). 
Thus, the two examples above are both accessible and correct.  
 In order to give us reason to think that unshakeable imaginability will be a trustworthy guide 




he takes certain impossibilities to be fs-unimaginable. Making these suppositions will shake our 
ability to subsequently fs-imagine those impossibilities, thus making it such that the impossibilities 
are not unshakeably imaginable. As such, making certain suppositions will constrain our ability to 
imagine impossibilities and give us reason to think that what we can imagine under those 
suppositions will be possible.  
Prior to presenting these cases, Gregory draws distinctions between various types of 
impossibilities. First, he distinguishes between a posteriori and a priori impossibilities. With respect to a 
posteriori impossibilities, Gregory further distinguishes between a posteriori impossibilities that depend 
on the non-contingency of rigid designators and a posteriori impossibilities that result from 
essentialism. I will argue later on that Kung’s counterexample constitutes an a posteriori impossibility 
that results from essentialism and so I will focus on Gregory’s line of reasoning with respect to that 
type of a posteriori impossibility.  
 Before proceeding further, it is necessary to note that Gregory and Kung endorse Kripkean 
essentialist claims about the necessity of origins.3 Kripke (1973) claims that if an object X originates 
from Y, then X originates from Y necessarily (152). This is an essentialist claim because it asserts 
that originating from Y is essential for being X.4 Thus, an object that shares many properties with X 
but does not originate from Y will not be X (152). For example, suppose that a table X is 
constructed out of a particular piece of wood. Kripke argues that in order to be table X it is 
necessary to be constructed out of that exact piece of wood (152). While a table could have exactly 
the same measurements as X and be placed in exactly the same location as X, that it would not be 
constructed out of the particular piece of wood from which X is constructed would make it not X.  
                                               
3 All of the accounts that I canvass in this thesis endorse Kripkean claims with respect to the necessary a posteriori.  
4 Note that this is not to claim that having origins Y is sufficient for being X. There are plausibly other factors that are 
necessary for being any given X. The claim is just that if X has origins Y, then having origins Y is one necessary 




 In order to see how an impossible proposition might be fs-unimaginable under a supposition 
it is best to consider an example. If we are Kripkeans, we are committed to the claim that the sun is 
necessarily composed of a particular ball of gas. While a ball of gas could have the same properties 
as the sun and be placed in exactly the same location as the sun, that it would not be composed of 
the particular ball of gas of which the sun is composed would make it not the sun. As such, a 
proposition like ‘the sun is made out of toenails’ is impossible.  
According to Gregory, we will find that proposition fs-unimaginable under the supposition 
that ‘the sun is not actually made of toenails.’ In other words, when we make that supposition, we 
will be unable to fs-imagine that the sun is made of toenails. Our inability to fs-imagine the 
impossible proposition in question under that supposition is then supposed to give us reason to 
think that we are justified in ascribing possibility to propositions about the sun that we do find fs-
imaginable under that supposition.  
I.B: Kung’s objection: 
Peter Kung (2016) offers several counterexamples that he takes to render Gregory’s notion 
of unshakeable imaginability untenable. The success of unshakeable imaginability as a guide to 
possibility hinges on both what fs-imagining under a supposition amounts to and whether doing so 
in fact places constraints on what we can or cannot fs-imagine. Kung raises skepticism about the 
constraining force of fs-imagining under a supposition by offering what he takes to be 
counterexamples of a posteriori impossibilities that remain fs-imaginable even under suppositions that 
ought to shake their imaginability. 
Kung takes Gregory to endorse a concept of fs-imagining under a supposition in which 
imagining X under the supposition that Y does not amount to imagining the conjunction of X and Y 
(330). There is evidence for this interpretation of Gregory’s view in a case that Gregory himself 




that if we try to fs-imagine that pigs fly under this supposition, “the question about our imaginative 
abilities should be construed as asking whether [we] can imagine a situation - whether actual or non-
actual - in which pigs fly (330).” The task is thus not to try to fs-imagine that pigs fly in the actual 
world, but rather to fs-imagine whether the actual world could be such that pigs fly or whether a 
possible world could be such that they do.  
According to Kung, this means that Gregory is not asking us to import our suppositions into 
our imagined scenarios. Kung takes this to be the case because importing a supposition X into an 
imagined scenario Y would amount to fs-imagining the conjunction of X and Y, but there will be 
cases where the conjunction of X and Y is an explicit contradiction (102). Kung then points out that 
explicit contradictions are not clearly fs-imaginable (102). 
 Kung demonstrates that imagining an explicit contradiction cannot be the task at hand by 
asking us to suppose that ‘dinosaurs are extinct’ (X) (102). He claims that even when we make the 
supposition above, we seem to have no problem fs-imagining ‘dinosaurs roaming the earth’ (Y) 
(102). Kung argues that this indicates that “there are clear cases where [we] can suppose that P and 
still fs-imagine that not-P (102).” Given that we cannot fs-imagine explicit contradictions, our ability 
to suppose P and still fs-imagine not-P in the dinosaur case offers further reason to think that we do 
not import our suppositions about what is the case in the actual world into our imaginings.  
Kung argues that on Gregory’s conception of imagining under a supposition, there is not 
sufficient reason to think that our suppositions will in fact constrain our imaginative abilities. He 
asserts that “once it is clear that we are not being asked to import the supposition into the imagined 
situation, it becomes harder to see what work the supposition does (103).” According to Kung, 
without our suppositions constraining our imaginings in any obvious way, it is unclear why 
impossibilities will not be just as fs-imaginable under suppositions as they are outside of them. This 




I.B.1: Kung’s Counterexample 
 Kung then presents a counterexample that he takes to demonstrate that Gregory has not 
given us sufficient reason to think that fs-imagining under a supposition will constrain our 
imaginative abilities. If suppositions are supposed to shake our ability to fs-imagine impossibilities by 
constraining our imaginative abilities, a demonstration of their lack of constraint would undermine 
Gregory’s view. First, Kung claims that even when we make the correct, accessible, non-modal 
supposition that “Madame Chiang Kai-Shek is not [Kung’s] great-grandmother,” we will still be able 
to fs-imagine the impossibility that she married Kung’s great-grandfather and “the fact that [we] 
accept the necessity of origins does not prevent [us] from imagining this (103).”  
The proposition that ‘Madame Chiang Kai-Shek married Kung’s great-grandfather’ is an a 
posteriori impossibility that we understand in virtue of accepting Kripkean essentialist claims with 
respect to the necessity of origins. If we are Kripkeans, then Madame Chiang Kai-Shek has the 
origins that she has (i.e. having parents X and Y) necessarily. However, we know that the person 
who married Kung’s great-grandfather did not have those same parents X and Y. If in order to be 
Madame Chiang Kai-Shek it is necessary to have had parents X and Y and the person who married 
Kung’s great-grandfather did not, then it is impossible for the person who married Kung’s great-
grandfather to have been Madame Chiang Kai-Shek. In raising this counterexample, Kung assumes 
that if we are Kripkeans about the necessity of origins, then being able to fs-imagine that ‘Madame 
Chiang Kai-Shek married his great-grandfather’ under a supposition whose content explicitly 
specifies her origins elsewhere should suffice for us to conclude that the proposition is unshakeably 
imaginable. Thus if unshakeable imaginability is supposed to give us evidence of possibility (i.e. 
count as m-imaginability) our ability to unshakeably imagine the impossibility that Madame Chiang 





I.C: Gregory’s Method Unmasked    
I argue that Kung’s objection gets off the ground only because he is mistaken about the way 
in which our knowledge of Kripkean essentialism works in Gregory’s line of reasoning. Gregory 
relies heavily upon Kripkean essentialism in order to claim that we are unable to fs-imagine a 
posteriori impossibilities under certain non-modal, accessible and correct suppositions. This is evident 
when we take a closer look at his ‘imagine the sun being made of toenails’ case. First, we are asked 
to suppose that the sun is actually not made of toenails, which is our non-modal, accessible, and 
correct supposition. Then, we are asked to appeal to our knowledge of Kripkean essentialism (334-
335). The Kripkean view tells us that if the sun is a particular mass of hot gas, then it is so 
necessarily. Thus even if some toenail constituted object was positioned in exactly the same location 
as the sun, that it would not be that particular mass of hot gas would make it not the sun. It is with 
this knowledge in mind that we are then asked to fs-imagine that the sun is made of toenails. 
However given the Kripkean claims to which we just appealed, any toenail constituted object we fs-
imagine (regardless of how many other sun-like properties it has) will not be the sun. We are thus 
unable to fs-imagine the sun being made of toenails under our supposition that it is actually not 
made of toenails.  
 This case reveals that it is by recognizing the Kripkean claims that follow from our 
supposition that we are rendered unable to fs-imagine the sun being made of toenails. Our 
supposition is non-modal, since we are supposing that the sun is actually not made of toenails. 
However, if we are Kripkeans, our non-modal claim ensures that a subsequent modal claim is true: 
If there is some X that is the sun and X is actually not made of toenails then X is necessarily not 
made of toenails. If this modal claim to necessity is true, then it is true across all possible worlds. 
Thus when we try to fs-imagine that the sun is made of toenails, we do so already knowing that 




appears that the sun is made of toenails cannot be an imagining in which it is the sun that is such (i.e. 
it would be an imagining in which another sun-like object is made of toenails). 
  Gregory gets close to revealing that this is what his line of reasoning is in fact doing when he 
says: “For some arguments take the following form: We could never imagine that Q; but if we were 
to make the supposition that R actually holds, then if we were to imagine that P under that 
supposition, we would thereby imagine that Q; so we cannot imagine that P, under the supposition 
that R actually holds (330).” However, Gregory neglects to make explicit that it is our knowledge of 
some Kripkean claim Z that restricts us from ever fs-imagining Q. When we suppose that R actually 
holds, R is such that if R is true then some Kripkean necessity claim Z is true. If we were to fs-
imagine P under the supposition R, we would fs-imagine Q but we could never fs-imagine Q 
because Z restricts us from being able to do so. In other words, that the sun is necessarily 
constituted by a particular mass of hot gas (Z) restricts us from being able to fs-imagine that the sun 
is made of toenails (Q).  
We are now in a position to re-evaluate Kung’s counterexample with a clearer picture of how 
Gregory’s method actually works. As before, we first make the correct, accessible and non-modal 
supposition that Madame Chiang Kai-Shek is not Kung’s great-grandmother. Gregory would 
presumably think that we should now appeal to the Kripkean claim that Madame Chiang Kai-Shek 
and Kung’s great-grandmother each have the distinct origins that they have necessarily. Thus in 
order to be Madame Chiang Kai-Shek it is necessary to have origins X and to be Kung’s great-
grandmother it is necessary to have origins Y. That our supposition is true thus ensures that the 
following modal claim is true: if Madame Chiang Kai-Shek is not Kung’s great-grandmother, then 
she is necessarily not Kung’s great-grandmother. Therefore, while we can fs-imagine that some person 
married Kung’s great-grandfather and we can fs-imagine that the person resembles Madame Chiang 




grandmother and thus we cannot fs-imagine that it is in fact Madame Chiang Kai-Shek who married 
Kung’s great-grandfather.5  
Section I.D: The Modal Conclusions First Charge 
 While Gregory’s line of reasoning in fact shows how suppositions (together with knowledge 
of certain Kripkean essentialist claims about the necessity of origins) might constrain our imaginative 
abilities, Kung would reject the correct interpretation of Gregory’s method on the basis of what he 
calls ‘modal conclusions first reasoning (102).’ Kung claims that if certain imaginings are supposed 
to act as independent evidence for our modal beliefs, then we should not use what modal intuitions 
we already have to arrive at those imaginings. To do so would be to conclude that our imagined 
scenarios only justify our thoughts on possibilities in case they accord with our antecedent modal 
intuitions. In no way would our imaginings be generating independent reason to boost the epistemic 
status of those modal intuitions. 
When Kung raises the ‘modal conclusions first’ objection, he argues that once we abandon 
‘modal conclusions first reasoning,’ a posteriori impossibilities like ‘Madame Chiang Kai-Shek married 
Kung’s great-grandfather’ become fs-imaginable even under suppositions that are supposed to 
render them fs-unimaginable. We previously found that proposition fs-unimaginable because a 
necessity of origins claim made it such that any individual we imagined (no matter closely she 
resembled Madame Chiang Kai-Shek) could not be Madame Chiang Kai-Shek. According to Kung, 
                                               
5 When I say that we cannot fs-imagine that “it is in fact Madame Chiang-Kai Shek who married Kung’s great-
grandfather” under the supposition that she is not his great-grandmother, I mean that we cannot fs-imagine that 
Madame Chiang-Kai Shek married the man who in fact became Peter Kung’s great-grandfather, and gave birth to the 
child who in fact became Peter Kung’s grandmother. Since Peter Kung has his origins necessarily and Madame Chiang-
Kai Shek is not Kung’s actual great-grandmother, if Madame Chiang-Kai Shek instead of Kung’s actual great-
grandmother had married the man who became Kung’s great-grandfather, then Kung would not have existed. So, it is 
impossible that Madame Chiang-Kai Shek married Peter Kung’s great-grandfather because any man who Madame 
Chiang-Kai Shek married would not have been Peter Kung’s great-grandfather because in that scenario, there is no Peter 
Kung! So, it is the impossible situation in which Madame Chiang-Kai Shek marries the person who in fact becomes Peter 
Kung’s great-grandfather that I take us to be unable to fs-imagine under the supposition that she is not his great-
grandmother. In the remainder of this thesis, I will refer to this impossible situation via the shorthand “Madame Chiang-




our imagining is doing no work if that scenario is only fs-unimaginable because our antecedent 
modal conclusions about the necessity of origins make it such that it is not. Kung concludes that 
‘modal conclusions first’ reasoning operates along these lines: “We should reject the imaginability of 
[certain cases] because they are impossible. We should deploy our prior modal convictions to infer, 
post hoc, whether we were or were not imagining what we thought we had imagined (103).”  
Kung’s characterization of modal conclusions first reasoning corresponds to what Paul 
Tidman (1994) calls “epistemic circularity (298).” Tidman argues that a line of reasoning exhibits 
epistemic circularity when “its premises can be defended only by tacitly assuming the truth of the 
conclusion (298).” Kung’s charge against Gregory accuses him of exactly this: that ‘Madame Chiang 
Kai-Shek married Kung’s great-grandfather’ is fs-unimaginable can only be defended by tacitly 
assuming that certain a posteriori impossibilities just will be fs-unimaginable under certain suppositions 
if we are Kripkeans about the necessity of origins. Therefore, to claim that Gregory uses ‘modal 
conclusions first’ reasoning is to claim that his line of reasoning is epistemically circular.  
I endorse Kung’s ‘modal conclusions first’ objection against Gregory and thus conclude that 
the unshakeable imaginability line of reasoning is epistemically circular. However, I argue that the 
scope of Kung’s ‘modal conclusions first’ objection must extend only over appeals to antecedent a 
posteriori modal knowledge. In contrast, I take us to be justified in appealing to antecedent modal 
knowledge of propositions known a priori. This is because we gain knowledge of both the truth value 
and the modal status of a priori propositions simply in virtue of grasping their constituent concepts. 
We thus can gain knowledge of the modal status of a priori propositions independently of the 
imagination.  
Further, we have reason to think that any proposition whose truth value we know solely in 
virtue of grasping its constituent concepts will be true in any possible world. For example, ‘bachelors 




to be an unmarried male. Should we imagine a world in which married men are referred to as 
‘bachelors’ we ought not to conclude that we have found a world in which there is a bachelor who is 
in fact a married male. Rather, we ought to conclude that in the world in question, the word 
‘bachelor’ corresponds to a different concept than does our word ‘bachelor.’ Given that a priori 
truths are necessary, they ought to come out m-imaginable. If a priori truths are necessary, then a 
priori falsehoods are impossible and thus ought to come out m-unimaginable.   
Unlike a priori propositions, we do not recognize the modal status of a posteriori propositions 
solely in virtue of grasping the concepts that make up those propositions. Our knowledge of their 
modal status is instead contingent on knowledge of external facts about the worlds of which their 
contents are predicated. Further, the imagination is the only tool with which we are currently 
attempting to acquire this modal knowledge. Thus, while we can gain knowledge of the modal status 
of a priori propositions independently of the imagination (i.e. by recognizing their constitutive 
conceptual relations), we have no such established independent means of gaining knowledge of the 
modal status of a posteriori propositions. Contra appeals to a priori modal knowledge then, to appeal 
to a posteriori modal knowledge is to appeal to modal knowledge gained from the imagination in 
order to see whether the imagination is a trustworthy provider of modal knowledge. Given that this 
move is epistemically circular, a successful account of the imagination as a modal epistemological 
tool cannot appeal to a posteriori modal knowledge.  
Section II: Ichikawa and Jarvis 
 I granted that Gregory’s appeal to Kripkean essentialist claims in order to shake our ability to 
imagine impossibilities under certain suppositions is epistemically illegitimate. It is circular to claim 
that our new modal claims that rely upon a posteriori propositions are justified in case they cohere 
with our antecedent modal beliefs about those propositions. However, by making this concession I 




propositions full stop. Instead, I argue in this section that Ichikawa and Jarvis (2012) introduce a 
framework that allows Gregory to make modal judgements about a posteriori propositions without 
having to resort to epistemic circularity.  
 In order to do so, I reconstruct Ichikawa and Jarvis’ position with respect to how we come 
to have knowledge of necessity. On their view, judgements of necessity arise from recognition of 
what they call conceptual entailments. Conceptual entailments will correspond to certain rational 
commitments to infer that we have in imagination. 
 Ichikawa and Jarvis first pick out a set of imaginings that they characterize as coherent. 
Coherent imaginings are imaginings whose contents are not absurdities.6 While Ichikawa and Jarvis 
do not specify the scope of absurdities, I take their examples to indicate that absurdities are a priori 
falsehoods (135). 7 On this definition, “the cat is on the mat” is coherent while “the married 
bachelor” is not. Ichikawa and Jarvis define the former, coherent cases as ‘conceptual possibilities,’ 
such that the contents of an fs-imagining will be conceptually possible in case that imagining is 
                                               
6 It is necessary to note that Ichikawa and Jarvis take supposing and imagining to mean the same thing. To this end, they 
use the words ‘suppose’ and ‘imagine’ interchangeably. Given that we often suppose absurdities (e.g. P&~P) for the sake 
of argument, this interchangeability allows that we can imagine absurdities.  
 
At first glance, that Ichikawa and Jarvis use ‘suppose’ and ‘imagine’ interchangeably seems to set them apart from 
Gregory, who distinguishes the two terms when establishing unshakeable imaginability. In that line of reasoning, 
suppositions are non-modal and true of the actual world while imaginings depict how the actual world could be or how a 
possible world could be. However, this alone does not suffice to say that Gregory takes the two terms to mean different 
things, because it says nothing of what Gregory thinks we can suppose when not trying to establish unshakeable 
imaginability. In fact, he does allow that we can suppose facts about how the actual world could be and facts about how 
possible worlds could be, provided that we are not using those suppositions in the unshakeable imaginability line of 
reasoning. This said, though Gregory also claims that we can suppose absurdities in more general circumstances, he 
maintains that we cannot fs-imagine them. 
 
While Ichikawa and Jarvis’ interchangeable use of ‘suppose’ and ‘imagine’ does distinguish them from Gregory with 
respect to absurdities, they preserve the Gregory/Yablo view that absurdities are in some sense fs-unimaginable when 
they distinguish imaginings that are coherent from those that are not. 
7 There will be cases where an absurdity will not be immediately recognizable as such (e.g. some people will not 
immediately realize that ‘there is some barber who shaves all and only those barbers who are not self-shavers’ is an 
absurdity). In these cases, Ichikawa and Jarvis would plausibly say that we will mistakenly take such absurdities to be 




coherent (135). Thus incoherent fs-imaginings (i.e. fs-imaginings whose contents are absurdities) will 
be conceptually impossible.  
The fact that coherent imaginability offers us knowledge of conceptual possibility will be 
important because a proposition must be conceptually possible in order to be metaphysically 
possible. However, recognizing conceptual possibility via coherent imaginability does not suffice for 
knowledge of metaphysical possibility because a posteriori impossibilities remain conceptually 
possible. For example, the proposition “Hesperus is not Phosphorus” is coherently fs-imaginable 
(and thus conceptually possible) because we come to know that “Hesperus is not Phosphorus” is 
false a posteriori and thus the proposition is not an absurdity. The proposition is thus conceptually 
possible even if metaphysically impossible. In contrast, recognizing conceptual impossibilities will 
guide us towards knowledge of metaphysical impossibilities because conceptual impossibilities are a 
priori falsehoods and a priori falsehoods are metaphysically impossible (e.g. a married bachelor is 
metaphysically impossible). So, while we are justified in inferring from conceptual to metaphysical 
impossibility, the a posteriori impossibilities ensure that no similar direct inference is available from 
conceptual to metaphysical possibility.  
II.A: Rational Commitments to Infer  
With conceptual possibility ruled out as sufficient for knowledge of metaphysical possibility, 
Ichikawa and Jarvis characterize a method of determining metaphysical possibility that proceeds by 
way of recognizing rational commitments to infer that we have in imagination. Our rational 
commitments to infer in imagination parallel the rational commitments to infer that we have in 
belief (137). For example, if I believe that I have deposited a check at the bank, I will be rationally 
committed to infer that the amount of money I deposited will appear in my bank account. I will 
infer this particular proposition because of some empirical knowledge that I have with respect to 




additional sum of money in my bank account, Ichikawa and Jarvis mean that I will believe that the 
money is in my account should the question arise.  
Analogously, if I imagine Sherlock Holmes depositing a check, I will imagine that there will 
be a new sum of money in his bank account should the question arise (i.e. and I thus can be said to 
have a rational commitment to infer that there will be a new sum of money in his bank account). 
Since our rational commitments in imagination parallel our rational commitments in belief, anything 
that explains our rational commitments to infer in belief will also explain our rational commitments 
to infer in imagination (137). 
 Rational commitments to infer appear as though they could either be defeasible or 
indefeasible. A rational commitment to infer Q from P would be defeasible if there are cases in 
which we will fail to have a rational commitment to infer Q even though P obtains and there is an 
evidentiary relation between P and Q (138-139). For example, I might not be rationally committed 
to infer that my bank account will have more money in it when I deposit a check if I do not know 
how banks function. In contrast, a rational commitment to infer Q from P would be indefeasible if 
we have a rational commitment to infer to Q in any possible case in which P obtains and there is an 
evidentiary relation between P and Q (138). For example, we might think that we will always have a 
rational commitment to infer that X is something if we know that X is a cat.  
However, Ichikawa and Jarvis argue that in fact no rational commitment to infer in belief is 
truly indefeasible because all such rational commitments can be defeated by our rational limitations 
(139). Rational limitations are limitations with respect to our ability to process evidence, such as 
limitations in computational capacity, tendencies to make errors when computing, or lack of 
knowledge of concepts (139). Instances where our rational commitment to infer Q from P is 
defeated by our rational limitations contrast with instances where gaining additional evidence defeats 




For example, suppose that John is spending his first winter in Boston and he learns that it is 
going to snow (P). Suppose that John does not realize that the streets in Boston are plowed after a 
snowfall, and so he forms a rational commitment to infer that the streets will soon be covered in 
snow (Q). However, upon learning that the streets in Boston are plowed after a snowfall, his rational 
commitment to infer is defeated. In this case, gaining additional evidence defeats John’s rational 
commitment to infer from P to Q even though Q obtains and there is an evidentiary relation 
between P and Q.8  
Contrast this with a case in which both John and Jill are given a logic problem. Jill gets the 
correct answer, but John does not. In this case, John’s failure to have a rational commitment to infer 
the correct answer is more aptly explained by something like errors in computation or lack of 
conceptual knowledge, because John and Jill have the same amount of evidence available to them 
and Jill infers the correct answer (i.e. she believes the correct answer when the question arises).  
Ichikawa and Jarvis claim that our rational commitments to infer in belief will always be vulnerable 
to being defeated in the latter of the two ways.  
Given that rational commitments to infer in imagination parallel rational commitments to 
infer in belief, rational commitments to infer in imagination will likewise always be vulnerable to 
defeat by our rational limitations. However, whereas in the belief case, being defeated by rational 
limitations contrasts with being defeated by paucity of evidence, in the imagination case, being 
defeated by rational limitations contrasts with being defeated by further imaginings. Since rational 
commitments to infer in imagination parallel rational commitments to infer in belief, we can say that 
imagining further scenarios is analogous to gaining further evidence.  
                                               
8 It is admittedly strange to think of John’s rational commitment being defeated because he has no rational commitment 
in the first place. This oddness is a product of I&J’s use of the term ‘defeator.’ In the subsequent logic problem case, 
John also has no rational commitment to infer in virtue of lacking the relevant conceptual knowledge (i.e. it’s not that he 




For example, suppose that someone tells you that it is raining in Las Vegas. You now have a 
rational commitment to infer that the streets in Las Vegas are wet, but that rational commitment to 
infer in belief could be defeated by your gaining the additional evidence that the streets in Las Vegas 
have in fact all been covered. Analogously, imagine that it is raining in Las Vegas. Doing so 
rationally commits you to infer in imagination that the streets in Las Vegas are wet, but your rational 
commitment to infer in imagination could be defeated by your further imagining that the streets in 
Las Vegas have all been covered. Thus while rational commitments to infer in belief and imagination 
can both be defeated by something other than our rational limitations, that ‘something other’ is 
further evidence in the belief case and further imaginings in the imagination case.  
II.B: Conceptual Entailment 
 Ichikawa and Jarvis utilize both rational commitments to infer in imagination and rational 
limitations in order to offer a characterization of conceptual entailment. A proposition P 
conceptually entails Q in case any failure on our part to infer Q when we imagine P results at least 
partly from either our rational limitations or evidence that we have concerning our rational 
limitations (140). We have evidence concerning our rational limitations when we know that our 
ability to process evidence is compromised in some way (e.g. knowing that we have taken a drug that 
causes extreme drowsiness). This characterization of conceptual entailment (CE) is equivalent to the 
claim that P conceptually entails Q in case any failure on our part to infer to Q given P does not 
result wholly from further beliefs in the belief case or wholly from further imaginings in the 
imagination case (140). 
 Ichikawa and Jarvis clarify what conceptual entailment in imagination is supposed to be by 
introducing a series of cases. For example, imagine that ‘Stephen knows that P.’ We have a rational 




be true. In order to see whether this rational commitment corresponds to a conceptual entailment in 
imagination, we must ask how our inference might be defeated.  
We might think that our inference could be defeated by the further imagining that “Stephen 
knows that P even though in fact, ~P (141).” However, if ‘Stephen knows that P’ in fact rationally 
commits us to infer ‘P,’ then “Stephen knows that P even though ~P” is an explicit contradiction, 
and explicit contradictions will entail any proposition, including P (141). Since our further imagining 
is an explicit contradiction that itself entails P, it fails to defeat our rational commitment to infer. 
Given that our rational commitment cannot be defeated by further imaginings, we can conclude that 
any failure to infer from ‘Stephen knows that P’ to ‘P’ will result from our own rational limitations. 
Thus ‘Stephen knows that P’ conceptually entails ‘P.’  
II.C: Conceptual Entailment as a Means of Recognizing Conceptual Necessity  
Ichikawa and Jarvis argue that we gain knowledge of what they define as conceptual 
necessity by recognizing conceptual entailments that obtain in our imagined scenarios. It is 
appreciating these conceptual necessities that will ultimately guide us towards knowledge of 
metaphysical necessity and possibility. How recognizing conceptual entailments guides us towards 
knowledge of conceptual necessity becomes clear via the following example. Suppose that we find 
out empirically that water is H2O. Our empirical knowledge thus rationally commits us to infer that 
“X is not water” should someone tell us that “X is not H2O.” However, it is not solely in virtue of 
recognizing this rational commitment to infer that we come know that necessarily, water is H2O 
(145). Rather, it is engaging in Putnam style thought experiments that reveals that if we know 
empirical facts about water and H2O, we will hold them as “tacit background imaginings” in our 
imagined scenarios (146). Recognizing the propositions that we tacitly imagine in the background 




How tacit background imaginings work becomes clear when we take up a Putnam style 
thought experiment in which we imagine that in some possible world, there is a non-H2O substance 
L that shares surface level properties with water but is actually composed of something called XYZ 
(145). We are then asked to imagine that in the actual world, scientists proclaim that they have been 
wrong all along about the liquid that we call ‘water’ on earth and assert that it is actually composed 
of XYZ instead of H2O (145). We are then asked whether the substance we imagined in the 
possible world is water. The obvious answer is supposed to be ‘yes’ and it is our rational 
commitments to infer about what substances count as water in our imagined scenario that are 
supposed to explain this response (145).   
 The rational commitments to infer that lead to our ‘yes’ response arise from our tacit 
background imaginings. Here it is necessary to first specify the content of the tacit background 
imagining that is doing the work. It is not that we tacitly imagine that ‘water is composed of H2O’ 
when engaging in the thought experiment above and that proposition rationally commits us to infer 
facts about what substances count as water in our imagined scenario. Rather, it is that we tacitly 
imagine that ‘whichever substance composes water does so uniformly’ and that gives rise to those 
rational commitments. This is a non-modal, a posteriori proposition, since we come to know about 
the uniform composition of water empirically. In order to see that this is the proposition operating in 
the background of the Putnam style thought experiment, we need only recognize that our answer to 
whether the possible world substance is water would be ‘no’ if we were told that the substance was 
only partially composed of XYZ.  
Thus, when we agree that our possible world substance L is water, we see that we are 
rationally committed to infer from our empirical knowledge about the uniform composition of water 
in the actual world to a judgement about what sorts of substances count as water in our possible 




infer in imagination that “L is water” from both the proposition that “in the actual world, the 
samples of water we interact with are uniformly composed of Y” and the proposition that “L is 
uniformly composed of Y (146).9”  
 Ichikawa and Jarvis argue that our rational commitment to infer in this Putnam style case 
corresponds to a conceptual entailment (146). In order to defeat our rational commitment to infer 
with a further imagining, we would have to imagine either that L is not composed of XYZ or that 
water is not composed of XYZ. However, if ‘L is composed of XYZ’ and ‘water is composed of 
XYZ’ in fact rationally commit us to infer that ‘L is water,’ then this would amount to us either 
imagining that ‘L is composed of XYZ even though L is not composed of XYZ’ or ‘water is 
composed of XYZ even though water is not composed of XYZ.’ Since either of our further 
imaginings create an explicit contradiction that itself entails any proposition including the 
proposition in question, both further imaginings fail to defeat our rational commitment to infer. 
Thus when we imagine ‘L is composed of XYZ’ and ‘water is composed of XYZ,’ any failure to 
infer in imagination from those propositions to “L is water” will result at least in part from our 
rational limitations, and this is what is required for conceptual entailment.  
Recognizing conceptual entailment relations such as these guide us towards knowledge of 
conceptual necessity. A proposition Q is conceptually necessary if and only if it is conceptually 
entailed by any proposition (142-143). Further, Ichikawa and Jarvis claim that the following 
equivalence with conceptual entailment obtains: if P conceptually entails Q, then the conditional 
(P⊃Q) is conceptually necessary (142-143). Thus when we recognize that P conceptually entails Q, 
where P is the conjunction (“water is composed of XYZ” and “L is composed of XYZ”) and Q is 
“L is water,” the equivalence with conceptual necessity entails that we also recognize that the 
                                               




conditional “If water is composed of XYZ and L is composed of XYZ, then L is water” is 
conceptually necessary.  
II.D: Conceptual Necessity Entails Metaphysical Necessity 
Ichikawa and Jarvis then argue that conceptual necessity entails metaphysical necessity (147). 
Previously, we saw that recognizing conceptual impossibilities guides us towards knowledge of 
metaphysical impossibilities. Here, recognizing conceptual necessities guides us towards knowledge 
of metaphysical necessities. 
 A proposition Q is conceptually necessary if and only if it is conceptually entailed by every 
proposition. This is to say that for every proposition P, we will be rationally committed to imagine Q 
when we imagine P and that rational commitment will correspond to a conceptual entailment. We 
know that at least one proposition P is true of every possible world. Thus if Q follows from any 
proposition then for every possible world, Q will follow from whichever proposition P is true of it. 
As such, if we are rationally committed to imagine Q when we imagine any proposition P, we will be 
rationally committed to imagine Q in every possible world and to be metaphysically necessary just is 
to obtain in every possible world. Ichikawa and Jarvis’ method thus reveals how we come to have 
knowledge of metaphysical necessity via our recognition of conceptual necessity relations that obtain 
in our imagined scenarios.  
Section III: Gregory’s Account Revisited  
III.A: Gregory’s Case 
We are now in a position to see whether appealing to Ichikawa and Jarvis’ framework might 
help the unshakeable imaginability line of reasoning avoid epistemic circularity. In order to do so, we 
can apply their methodology to Gregory’s case: that it is impossible to fs-imagine Madame Chiang 
Kai-Shek marrying Kung’s great-grandfather under the supposition that she was not his great-




origins in order to assert that the supposition above shook the imaginability of the impossibility and 
Kung raised concerns about epistemic legitimacy. The test then is to see whether Gregory can 
instead appeal to Ichikawa and Jarvis’ framework in order to do the same work that his appeal to 
that Kripkean essentialist claim once did.   
First, we must turn Gregory’s case into a Putnam style thought experiment. We know that 
Madame Chiang Kai-Shek is not Kung’s great-grandmother.10 Now we fs-imagine a possible world 
in which there is a person X who is not Madame Chiang Kai-Shek. Then we imagine that in the 
actual world, Kung was mistaken about his ancestry and Madame Chiang Kai-Shek is in fact his 
great-grandmother. If asked whether X is Kung’s great-grandmother, our answer will be ‘no.’  
We must again specify the content of the tacit background imagining that causes our ‘no’ 
response. In the water/h2O case, we tacitly imagined that ‘whatever substance composes water does 
so uniformly,’ and that imagining determined which substances counted as water in our imagined 
scenario. In this case, our response reveals that we tacitly imagine that ‘whomever is Kung’s great-
grandmother has origins Y,’ and this background imagining determines which person counts as 
Kung’s great-grandmother in our imagined scenario. More precisely, that tacit background imagining 
rationally commits us to infer that X is not Kung’s great-grandmother when we imagine that 1) in 
the actual world, Madame Chiang Kai-Shek is Kung’s great-grandmother and 2) X does not share 
origins Y with (i.e. and thus has distinct origins from) Madame Chiang Kai-Shek.  
Further, this rational commitment will correspond to a conceptual entailment. If we imagine 
that ‘in the actual world it turns out that Madame Chiang Kai-Shek is Kung’s great-grandmother’ 
and that ‘X does not share origins Y with Madame Chiang Kai-Shek’ we are rationally committed to 
infer that ‘X is not Kung’s great-grandmother.’ In order to defeat our rational commitment with 
further imaginings, we would have to imagine that it turns out that X does in fact share origins Y 
                                               




with Madame Chiang Kai-Shek. However, if ‘X does not share origins Y with Madame Chiang Kai-
Shek’ in fact rationally commits us to infer ‘X is not Kung’s great-grandmother’ then “X shares 
origins with Madame Chiang Kai-Shek even though X does not share origins with Madame Chiang 
Kai-Shek” is an explicit contradiction, and we have already seen that explicit contradictions will 
entail any proposition, including ‘X is not Kung’s great-grandmother’ (141). Since our further 
imagining creates an explicit contradiction that itself entails the proposition in question, it fails to 
defeat our rational commitment to infer. As such, any failure to infer will result from our own 
rational limitations. We thus have a case of conceptual entailment.  
It is now time to see how appealing to the conceptual entailment above can shake the fs-
imaginability of ‘Madame Chiang Kai-Shek married Kung’s great-grandfather’ under the supposition 
that she was not his great-grandmother. First, we make that supposition. Then, we run the Putnam 
style thought experiment illustrated above. Doing so allows us to recognize that the proposition  
‘whomever is Kung’s great-grandmother has origins Y,’ is acting as a tacit background imagining and 
conceptually entailing facts about which people count as Kung’s great-grandmother in our imagined 
scenarios. Since our supposition tells us that Madame Chiang Kai-Shek is not Kung’s great-
grandmother (and thus has distinct origins from her), we recognize that the conceptual entailments 
that obtain in our imagined scenario make it such that whomever we fs-imagine marrying Kung’s 
great-grandfather under our supposition will not be the person who gave birth to Kung’s 
grandmother.  
Appealing to conceptual entailments thus offers Gregory a means of establishing fs-
imagining under a supposition as a trustworthy method for shaking the imaginability of 
impossibilities in a way that is epistemically non-circular. I conclude that supplementing Gregory’s 
account with Ichikawa and Jarvis’ conceptual entailment framework in this way leaves him with a 




unshakeably imaginable on that line of reasoning, we now have reason to think that propositions 
that do come out unshakeably imaginable will be possible. In the next section, I explicate how 
Gregory’s unshakeable imaginability line of reasoning justifies our ascriptions of possibility.  
III.B: Knowledge of Metaphysical Possibility 
 Gregory argues that we will be justified in concluding that a proposition is possible when we 
take ourselves to be able to inductively infer to its unshakeable imaginability (343). For example, 
suppose that we want to find out whether it is possible that there are striped elephants in Barmby 
Moor (343). First, we identify accessible, non-modal suppositions under which we have reason to 
think ‘there are striped elephants in Barmby Moor’ might be fs-unimaginable. One such candidate 
supposition might be the explicit denial of the proposition whose modal status we are attempting to 
determine (i.e. ‘there are no striped elephants in Barmby Moor’). According to Gregory, we will be 
able to fs-imagine that Barmby Moor contains striped elephants under the supposition that there are 
no striped elephants at Barmby Moor (343). We are then supposed to repeat this process with 
additional suppositions “until we feel safe to infer inductively -- as we surely eventually will -- that 
striped elephants at Barmby Moor are unshakeably imaginable (343).”  
 In previous sections, we established unshakeable imaginability as a trustworthy means of 
determining possibility so long as we supplement it with Ichikawa and Jarvis’ conceptual entailment 
framework. We are thus justified in taking it to be possible that there are striped elephants at 
Barmby Moor so long as we find ‘there are striped elephants at Barmby Moor’ unshakeably 
imaginable. So while Kung’s critique caused us to revise the unshakeable imaginability line of 
reasoning in order to avoid being epistemically circular, making such a revision leaves Gregory with 






Section IV: Yablo  
Section IV.A: Yablo’s View: 
In this section, I introduce Stephen Yablo’s (1993) error theoretic account of the imagination 
as a guide to knowledge of possibilities. In the proceeding section, I argue that it is subject to the 
same ‘modal conclusions first’ worry as is Gregory’s account but can likewise reconcile the worry if 
we supplement it with Ichikawa and Jarvis’ conceptual entailment framework. Like Gregory, Yablo 
identifies a specific type of imagining as modally salient (i.e. m-imagining). On Yablo’s view, we m-
imagine P if we imagine a world of which it is veridical that P (29). The claim that P is true of a 
possible world W amounts to the claim that if W had existed, then P would have been the case (29). 
As such, when we imagine a world of which P is veridical (i.e. m-imagine P), it appears to us that P 
is possible (29). We are prima facie justified in taking P to be possible in case we can imagine P in this 
way.  
However, our prima facie justification can be defeated because we are able to m-imagine 
impossible propositions if we lack knowledge that the propositions in question are in fact 
impossible. Because we are prima facie justified in taking what we m-imagine to be possible, we will 
also be prima facie justified in taking what are in fact impossible propositions to be possible until we 
gain knowledge of their impossibility. Finding out that the propositions in question are impossible 
will then defeat our prima facie justification for taking them to be possible. 
For example, philosophers prior to Kripke plausibly were able to m-imagine a world of 
which it is veridical that water is composed of a non-H2O chemical composite XYZ (34). They were 
thus prima facie justified in taking that claim to be possible. However, if we are Kripkeans, we have 
reason to think that water is necessarily composed of H2O. This is because ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ are 
what Kripke (1973) calls rigid designators. If X is a rigid designator, then if X designates Y then X 




designates that liquid in every possible world and the same is true for ‘H2O’. Given that ‘water’ and 
‘H2O’ designate one and the same liquid, they designate one and the same liquid in every possible 
world. In other words, water is necessarily one and the same liquid as H2O (i.e. we can say that 
water is necessarily composed of H2O). Once we accept Kripkean claims, our prima facie justification 
for taking it to be possible that water is composed of XYZ is defeated.  
Further, accepting these Kripkean claims will make it m-unimaginable that there is a world 
of which it is true that ‘Water is composed of XYZ.’ Given that water is necessarily composed of 
H2O, any world in which a substance appears to be composed of XYZ is not a world in which water 
is composed of XYZ. In this way, modal errors arise due to ignorance. We can m-imagine what are 
in fact impossible propositions because we fail to recognize that those propositions are in fact 
impossible. Once we recognize that the propositions in question are impossible, we will no longer be 
able to m-imagine them.  
More formally, Yablo argues that for every impossible proposition P there exists a modal 
conditional of the form (if Q then ⟏ ~P) (29).11 When we find impossible propositions m-
imaginable, either we lack knowledge of Q or we lack knowledge of the modal conditional (29). We 
can now formulate the case above on this model. Let P be the impossible proposition ‘Water is 
composed of XYZ.’ Let’s make Q ‘In the actual world, water is uniformly composed of H2O.’  
We now need reason to accept the modal conditional as true because once we do so, we can 
conclude that if Q is true then ⟏ ~P must be the case. Yablo establishes the modal conditional as 
true via a method akin to the Ramsey test (29). In order to establish a given indicative conditional as 
true on the Ramsey test, we are to suppose that we are reliably informed of the antecedent and then 
consider, under that supposition, how plausible we find the consequent (29, n.66). If we find the 
                                               




consequent plausible then we ought to accept the indicative conditional as true. Given that (if Q 
then ⟏ ~P) has a modal consequent, we need to amend the Ramsey test slightly (29, n.66). We again 
suppose that we are reliably informed of the antecedent, but instead of considering whether we find 
the consequent plausible we consider whether we find the consequent fs-imaginable. This is to say 
that we consider whether we find P fs-imaginable under the supposition that we are reliably 
informed that Q. If we find P fs-unimaginable under the supposition that we are reliably informed 
that Q, then we can accept the conditional (if Q then ⟏ ~P) as true.  
It is necessary to recognize both Q and the modal conditional as true in order to no longer 
be able to m-imagine P. If we have reason to think that Q is true but lack knowledge that Q 
guarantees ⟏ ~P, then we will still be able to m-imagine that P. In contrast if we know that Q 
guarantees ⟏ ~P but we are unaware that Q is in fact true, we will still be able to m-imagine P. Thus 
we can m-imagine P and in doing so form false beliefs about the modal status of P in case we lack 
knowledge of either of Q, or of the modal conditional, or of both. So while there is a modally 
relevant way of imagining on Yablo’s view, we are prima facie justified in taking what we imagine in 
that way to be possible in case we have reason to think that there will be both no Q and no modal 
conditional around to defeat that prima facie justification.  
Section IV.B: Kung’s Modal Conclusions First Critique of Yablo:  
 Kung argues that knowledge of both Q and the modal conditional (if Q then ⟏ ~P) will fail 
to prevent us from being able to m-imagine P. This is because given that Q will be a non-modal a 
posteriori proposition about the actual world and such propositions can fail to obtain, Yablo must 
accept that we can fs-imagine that Q fails to obtain (101). For example, we might fs-imagine that in 




H2O. Thus even if we establish the modal conditional (if Q then ⟏ ~P), if Q does not obtain then 
we cannot conclude that ⟏ ~P.  
Recognizing that ⟏ ~P obtains is supposed to render us unable to m-imagine P. Thus, if we 
can no longer conclude that ⟏ ~P, we will find P m-imaginable. So, we do not have reason to think 
that gaining knowledge of both Q and of (if Q then ⟏ ~P) will render P m-unimaginable if we can 
fs-imagine that Q fails to obtain even when we know Q and fs-imagining that Q fails to obtain 
allows us to m-imagine P.  
 Kung argues that Yablo might be able to block this worry by conceding that while we can fs-
imagine that non-modal facts can fail to obtain, impossible propositions will still be m-unimaginable 
if we hold certain non-modal facts fixed. Kung takes holding a proposition fixed to amount to 
supposing that proposition and so to hold a proposition like ‘in the actual world, water is uniformly 
composed of H2O’ fixed is to suppose that ‘in the actual world, water is uniformly composed of 
H2O’ is true. We have already seen that if ‘in the actual world, water is uniformly composed of 
H2O’ (Q) is true and we accept the modal conditional, then we are justified in concluding that ⟏ 
~P.  As such, it seems as though our knowledge of both Q and of the modal conditional does in fact 
render us unable to m-imagine P so long as we hold Q fixed.  
Even so, we can continue to push back on Yablo’s line of reasoning by objecting to the 
means by which he establishes the modal conditional (if Q then ⟏ ~P). If it turns out that we do 
not have reason to accept the modal conditional, then even holding Q fixed will not render us 
unable to m-imagine P because that Q is true will not guarantee ⟏ ~P. Recall that we established the 




we found P fs-unimaginable when supposing Q, we had reason to accept the modal conditional (if 
Q then ⟏ ~P).  
While Yablo claims to find P fs-unimaginable under the supposition that Q, how this is so is 
not obvious. The proposition ‘in the actual world, water is uniformly composed of H2O’ (Q) is a 
non-modal a posteriori fact about the actual world. Recall that when evaluating Gregory’s unshakeable 
imaginability line of reasoning, we established that we are not to import our actual world 
suppositions into our imagined scenarios. Thus just as we saw earlier, it is not clear why supposing 
that ‘in the actual world, water is uniformly composed of H2O’ will prevent us from being able to 
fs-imagine either that the actual world could be such that water is not uniformly composed of H2O 
or that a possible world could be such that that is the case. Given that we do not import our actual 
world suppositions into our imagined scenarios, there is not sufficient reason to think that our 
supposition will in fact constrain our imaginative abilities.  
I argue that supposing ‘in the actual world, water is uniformly composed of H2O’ (Q) will 
only prevent us from being able to fs-imagine ‘water is composed of XYZ’ (P) if we take ‘in the 
actual world, water is uniformly composed of H2O’ to ensure that the following modal claim is true: 
if in the actual world, water is uniformly composed of H2O, then necessarily water is uniformly 
composed of H2O. Let’s call this modal claim Z. We can thus say that it is only by assuming that Q 
ensures Z that we will find P fs-unimaginable when we suppose Q. 
In order to see how appealing to the modal claim above helps render our impossible 
proposition P fs-unimaginable, first make the supposition that ‘in the actual world, water is 
uniformly composed of H2O.’ If we are Kripkeans, then we will recognize that ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ 
are rigid designators. Our supposition thus ensures that the following modal claim is true: if in the 
actual world, water is uniformly composed of H2O, then necessarily water is uniformly composed of 




can fs-imagine that the liquid is water-like, that water is necessarily composed of H2O ensures that 
the liquid in question is not water. We thus cannot fs-imagine that water is not composed of H2O 
under the supposition that in the actual world, it is uniformly composed of H2O.  
 Yablo thus establishes his modal conditional via the same imagining-under-a-supposition line 
of reasoning that Gregory uses in order to establish unshakeable imaginability as a guide to 
knowledge of possibilities. Both Gregory and Yablo need to isolate a set of suppositions under 
which impossible propositions will be fs-unimaginable. Recall that for Gregory, showing that a 
certain set of suppositions render impossible propositions fs-unimaginable gives us reason to think 
that propositions that are fs-imaginable under those suppositions will be possible. In contrast, Yablo 
needs impossible propositions to be fs-unimaginable under certain suppositions in order to establish 
the modal conditionals that are doing work in his explanation of modal error. It is gaining 
knowledge of those modal conditionals (in addition to gaining knowledge of the truth of their 
antecedents) that is supposed to render impossible propositions m-unimaginable.  
Since Yablo uses the same line of reasoning as Gregory in order to establish his modal 
conditional, he too is subject to Kung’s ‘modal conclusions first’ objection. Gaining knowledge of 
the modal conditional (if Q then ⟏ ~P) is supposed make P m-unimaginable to us. However, we 
only have reason to accept the conditional if we find P fs-unimaginable when we suppose Q, and 
this will only obtain if we assume that Q ensures the a posteriori modal claim Z. This is to say that P is 
only m-unimaginable to us when we suppose Q because our antecedent a posteriori modal conclusion 
Z makes it such that P is fs-unimaginable to us. To adopt this line of reasoning is thus again what 
Kung would classify as “deploy[ing] our modal convictions to infer, post hoc, whether we were or 
were not imagining what we thought we had imagined (103).” While we are justified in appealing to 
antecedent a priori modal knowledge, Kung is right in pointing out that deploying our a posteriori 




classifying our imaginings as guides to possibility in case those imaginings adhere to our antecedent a 
posteriori modal beliefs, then in no way do our imaginings generate independent reason to boost the 
epistemic status of our novel a posteriori modal intuitions. 
Section IV.C: Yablo as Helped by Ichikawa and Jarvis:  
 Though Yablo commits the same ‘modal conclusions first’ error as Gregory, that they use 
the same line of reasoning means that Yablo too can avoid epistemic circularity if we supplement his 
view with Ichikawa and Jarvis’ conceptual entailment framework. Just as in the Gregory case, we 
need appealing to conceptual entailments to do the same work that appealing to an antecedent a 
posteriori modal belief is currently doing. The antecedent Kripkean modal belief Z currently makes P 
fs-unimaginable when we suppose Q. As such, we need recognizing the conceptual entailments that 
follow from Q to likewise make P fs-unimaginable when we suppose Q.   
To see how this would work on Yablo’s account, we must first turn the water/H2O case 
into a Putnam-style thought experiment. Recall that we have already seen this very thought 
experiment when I explicated Ichikawa and Jarvis’ conceptual entailments framework in Section II. 
We know that in the actual world, water is composed of H2O. Now we fs-imagine a far-off world W 
where there is a non-H2O substance S that shares surface level properties with water but is actually 
composed of something called XYZ. Now we fs-imagine that in the actual world, it turns out that 
scientists were wrong about the liquid that we call ‘water’ on earth and assert that it is actually 
composed of XYZ. When asked whether S is water, our answer will be ‘yes.’  
As in the Putnam style thought experiments we examined before, we must specify the 
content of the tacit background imagining that is eliciting our ‘yes’ response. Recall that previously, 
we established that it’s not the case that we tacitly fs-imagine ‘water is composed of H2O’ and that 
proposition rationally commits us to infer facts about what substances count as water in our 




uniformly,’ and this imagining  gives rise to our rational commitments. More specifically, it is this 
tacit imagining that gives rise to our rational commitment to infer that ‘S is water’ from the 
proposition that ‘the actual world, water is uniformly composed of Y’ and ‘S is uniformly composed 
of Y.12  
Further, it’s not the case that our rational commitment to infer can be defeated. Just as 
before, in order to defeat our rational commitment to infer with a further imagining we would have 
to imagine either that S is not composed of XYZ or that water is not composed of XYZ. However, 
if ‘S is composed of XYZ’ and ‘water is composed of XYZ’ in fact rationally commit us to infer that 
‘S is water,’ then this would amount to us either imagining that ‘S is composed of XYZ even though 
S is not composed of XYZ’ or ‘water is composed of XYZ even though water is not composed of 
XYZ.’ Since either of our further imaginings creates an explicit contradiction that itself entails any 
proposition including the proposition in question (‘S is water’) both further imaginings fail to defeat 
our rational commitment to infer. As such, any failure to infer in this case will result at least in part 
from our own rational limitations. We thus have a case of conceptual entailment.  
It is now time to see how recognizing the conceptual entailments above can explain why 
‘water is composed of XYZ’ will be fs-unimaginable under the supposition that in the actual world, 
water is composed of H2O. First, we suppose that in the actual world, water is composed of H2O 
(Q). Then, we run the Putnam style thought experiment illustrated above. Doing so allows us to 
recognize that the proposition that ‘whichever substance composes water does so uniformly’ is 
acting as a tacit background imagining and conceptually entailing facts about which liquids count as 
water in our imagined scenarios. Since our supposition tells us that in the actual world the samples 
of water we interact with are composed of H2O, we recognize that the conceptual entailments that 
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modifier when we realize that our answer to whether the possible world substance is water would be ‘no’ if we were told 




obtain in our imagined scenario make it such that whatever liquid we imagine being composed of 
XYZ under our supposition will not be water.  
Appealing to Ichikawa and Jarvis’ conceptual entailments framework thus can do the same 
work that appealing to antecedent a posteriori modal knowledge once did in allowing Yablo to 
establish his modal conditional. Since we have reason to accept the modal conditional, we have a 
tenable means by which to account for modal error. Gaining knowledge of the etiology of modal 
errors puts the modal beliefs that we do form on more solid footing. So long as we have reason to 
think that neither Q nor the modal conditional (if Q then ⟏ ~P) obtains, we can take ourselves to 
be prima facie justified in believing that P is possible when we m-imagine P. As such, supplementing 
Yablo’s line of reasoning with Ichikawa and Jarvis’ conceptual entailments framework allows us to 
end up with an additional defensible error theoretic view.  
Section V: Against Ichikawa and Jarvis’ Positive View  
 I have argued that both Gregory and Yablo need to rely on Ichikawa and Jarvis’ conceptual 
entailments framework in order to be epistemically non-circular. Given this dependence, we might 
wonder whether we ought to abandon both Gregory and Yablo’s views in favor of Ichikawa and 
Jarvis’ own positive view. If the latter constitutes an epistemically non-circular view on its own, we 
might think that it is preferable to a view that requires supplementation. In this section, I reject this 
move on the grounds that Ichikawa and Jarvis’ line of reasoning, while successful, is not a line of 
reasoning on which the imagination is justifying our modal beliefs. I argue instead that we are better 
off endorsing either Gregory or Yablo’s positive view even if both views require supplementation in 






Ichikawa and Jarvis provide a means of recognizing possibility that they call “moderate 
modal rationalism (MRR) (147).” MRR is as follows:  
MRR: A proposition P is metaphysically possible if and only if both P is conceptually possible and 
there is no Q such that both Q does not obtain in the actual world and P conceptually entails that it 
obtains in the actual world (147).  
 
 In order to conclude that P is metaphysically possible then, we must determine whether the 
right side of the biconditional obtains. We can do this by evaluating each of its constitutive 
conjuncts in turn. First, we determine whether P is conceptually possible. A proposition is 
conceptually possible in case it is coherently imaginable and Ichikawa and Jarvis’ characterization of 
coherent imaginability indicates that something is coherently imaginable in case it is not a priori false. 
So we can plausibly evaluate whether the first conjunct is true just by determining whether P is a 
priori false, and we do not need to employ the imagination in order to do that.  
 Given that the second conjunct consists in two sub-conjuncts, we need to evaluate the status 
of each of those sub-conjuncts in turn. In other words, we need to determine both whether Q does 
not obtain in the actual world and determine whether P conceptually entails Q in the actual world. 
So long as at least one of those two sub-conjuncts is false, there will be no Q such that both Q does 
not obtain in the actual world and P conceptually entails Q in the actual world, and thus the second 
main conjunct will obtain.  
To begin, we should determine the set of propositions Q that are conceptually entailed by P. 
After we do this, we can determine whether any of those propositions Q obtain in the actual world. 
If there is a proposition Q that both is conceptually entailed by P and obtains in the actual world, 
the second main conjunct of the right side of MRR will fail to obtain and P cannot be possible. If 
there is no such proposition Q, then (provided that P is conceptually possible) we will be justified in 




It’s not the case that we need to employ the imagination in order to determine whether P 
conceptually entails that Q obtains in the actual world. If P conceptually entails Q, then we have a 
rational commitment to infer Q given P. So, in order to determine whether P conceptually entails 
that Q obtains in the actual world we need to first see whether we have a rational commitment to 
infer Q in the actual world given P.  
However, if we have a rational commitment to infer Q from P in the actual world, our 
rational commitment to infer will be a rational commitment to infer in belief not a rational 
commitment to infer in imagination. This is because our rational commitments to infer to states of 
affairs that obtain in the actual world are determined by our current beliefs. For example, suppose that 
I learn that my friend has put my clothes into the washer. Given my current beliefs about how 
washers work, I will have a rational commitment to infer in belief that in the actual world my clothes 
are wet. In this way, my current beliefs about a posteriori evidentiary relations that obtain in the actual 
world (i.e. that putting clothes in the washer will make them wet) determine what I will be rationally 
committed to infer with respect to states of affairs that will obtain in the actual world.  
In contrast, rational commitments in imagination only commit us to make inferences about 
states of affairs that obtain in imagined scenarios. For example, suppose that I imagine that my 
friend has put my clothes in the washer. Given what obtains in my imagined scenario, I will have a 
rational commitment to infer in imagination that my clothes are wet. In this case, my importing 
some of my actual world beliefs about the evidentiary relation between putting clothes in the washer 
and having clothes that are wet causes me to have this rational commitment in imagination.  
However, my importing some of my actual world beliefs about evidentiary relations into my 
imagined scenario does not mean that my rational commitment to infer in imagination commits me 
to infer that my clothes are wet in the actual world. I have a rational commitment to infer that my 




clothes are in the washer. As such, I am only rationally committed to infer that my clothes are wet in 
the imagined scenario in which my friend puts my clothes in the washer. Thus, my rational 
commitments in imagination will not tell me about what I am rationally committed to infer about 
the actual world. So, if we have a rational commitment to infer that Q obtains in the actual world 
given P, that rational commitment will be a rational commitment to infer in belief.  
In order to see whether my rational commitment to infer in belief corresponds to a 
conceptual entailment, I must determine whether my rational commitment can be defeated by 
gaining further evidence. With respect to the washer/clothes case above, I do so by consulting my 
current beliefs about the evidentiary relations between putting clothes in the washer and having 
clothes that are wet. My past a posteriori experience tells me that this evidentiary relation is defeasible. 
For example, if the washer has a leak then presumably putting my clothes in the washer will not 
make them wet. I can thus conclude that my rational commitment to infer in belief does not 
correspond to a conceptual entailment, but I have not employed my imagination in order to reach 
this conclusion.  
In order to determine the status of the first sub-conjunct of the second main conjunct, we 
needed to determine both whether we have a rational commitment to infer that Q obtains in the 
actual world given P and whether that rational commitment corresponds to a conceptual entailment. 
However, given that rational commitments to infer to states of affairs that obtain in the actual world 
are rational commitments in belief, we accomplished both of these tasks without employing the 
imagination. As such, we need not use the imagination in order to evaluate the status of the first 
sub-conjunct.  
It is likewise not the case that we need to employ the imagination in order to determine the 
status of the second sub-conjunct. In order to determine whether the second sub-conjunct is true, 




a posteriori investigation or via appeal to a priori knowledge, neither of which require us to use our 
imagination.  
We can thus conclude that we do not need to employ our imagination in order to determine 
the truth value of the second main conjunct of the right side of MRR. Given that we also do not 
need to use the imagination in order to determine the truth value of the first main conjunct of the 
right side and determining the truth value of both conjuncts suffices to determine whether P is 
possible, we need not employ the imagination to determine whether P is possible on MRR. To this 
end, though Ichikawa and Jarvis may have offered us a tenable means of determining whether P is 
possible, it is not a means on which the imagination is acting as a guide to knowledge of possibilities. 
However, the project at hand is to determine whether the imagination can help us justify our modal 
beliefs. Thus, even if MRR succeeds in giving us knowledge of possibilities, it will not be of much 
help for our purposes because it does not employ the imagination in order to do so. 
Section VI: In Favor of Gregory (2004) and Yablo (1993)  
I have argued that we ought to reject Ichikawa and Jarvis’ positive view. However, I have 
also argued that both Gregory and Yablo must appeal to Ichikawa and Jarvis’ conceptual entailments 
framework in a substantive way. Since Ichikawa and Jarvis’ positive view relies upon conceptual 
entailments and does not employ the imagination, we might wonder if Gregory and Yablo’s lines of 
reasoning, once revised, will likewise no longer employ the imagination. In this section, I argue that 
this objection fails to distinguish between the types of conceptual entailments to which the 
respective accounts appeal. I take the conceptual entailments to which both Gregory and Yablo 
appeal to be of a different type than those to which Ichikawa and Jarvis appeal in their positive view. 
This allows the former two accounts to preserve the imagination as a modal epistemological tool 




 In order to determine the status of the second main conjunct of MRR, we determined 
whether there is some Q such that Q does not obtain in the actual world even though P 
conceptually entails that it does. The conceptual entailment relation that we need to determine thus 
only concerns what is entailed with respect to the actual world. I argued in Section V that determining 
what P conceptually entails in the actual world does not require us to employ our imagination.  
 In contrast, both Gregory and Yablo are concerned with what a proposition P conceptually 
entails in possible worlds. Both Gregory and Yablo need certain suppositions P to render certain 
impossible propositions Q fs-unimaginable. First, we suppose a proposition P. Then we see what P 
conceptually entails in possible worlds. If we have reason to think that a proposition Q is 
impossible, we need P to conceptually entail ~Q (i.e. because then the conditional if P then ~Q will 
be conceptually necessary). If P conceptually entails ~Q in every possible world, then we will be 
unable to fs-imagine Q when supposing P. This conceptual entailment line of reasoning gives 
Gregory and Yablo an epistemically non-circular means of explaining why supposing P will render Q 
fs-unimaginable. 
In order to determine whether P conceptually entails ~Q in a possible world W, we have to 
determine whether we have a rational commitment to infer ~Q given P in W. Recall that in Section 
V, I argued that rational commitments with respect to the actual world are commitments in belief, 
while rational commitments with respect to possible worlds are commitments in imagination. Thus, 
in this case we are concerned with whether we have a rational commitment to infer ~Q given P in 
imagination. Since we must determine whether we have this rational commitment in order to 
determine whether P conceptually entails ~Q, determining what P conceptually entails in possible 
worlds does require us to employ our imaginations. 
Thus, Gregory and Yablo rely on conceptual entailments that correspond to rational 




entailments that correspond to rational commitments in belief. Given that making the former type 
of commitment requires us to employ our imaginations, it’s not the case that appealing to Ichikawa 
and Jarvis’ conceptual entailments framework requires Gregory and Yablo to abandon the 
imagination as a modal epistemological tool. Gregory and Yablo’s use of conceptual entailments is 
instead compatible with their accounts giving us reason to think that the imagination will guide us 
towards knowledge of possibilities. As such, I conclude that their two error theoretic accounts are 
the most promising for the project at hand and it is them that I will evaluate alongside competing 































CHAPTER II: IMAGISTIC ACCOUNTS 
That some of our imaginings contain mental imagery is not novel to us.13 When asked to 
imagine a cat on a mat, I may form a mental image of a cat in order to do so. On an imagistic 
account, it is precisely the imagistic medium of certain imaginings that makes them suitable guides to 
knowledge of possibilities. We are justified in ascribing possibility to our imagistic imaginings in case 
their depicted content has the necessary good-making features. Further, contra the error theoretic 
lines of reasoning that we saw in the previous chapter, the imagistic view holds that we cannot be 
mistaken about what we imagine. I imagine X in case I take myself to be imagining X, and I err in 
ascribing possibility to X when I fail to recognize that the depicted content of my imagining lacks 
the requisite good-making features for providing justification for my thoughts on possibilities.  
In this chapter, I canvass Peter Kung’s (2010) and Dominic Gregory’s (2019) imagistic 
accounts of the imagination as a guide to knowledge of possibilities. In Section I, I explicate Kung’s 
positive view. In doing so, I highlight the places where his line of reasoning relies on a tight analogy 
between the imagination and our perceptual faculties. I then explicate a method that Kung proposes 
in order to facilitate imaginings of mental images that depict complex objects.  
In Section II, I take up Gregory’s positive view. Gregory introduces a justificatory distinction 
that allows him to block our imaginings of certain impossible figures from being probative. In order 
to do so, he too relies upon a tight analogy between visual perception and imagination. I explicate 
the justificatory distinction with respect to vision and then illustrate how that tight analogy facilities 
the applicability of the distinction to imagination. I conclude this chapter by underlining some key 
features that set both Kung and Gregory’s accounts apart from the error theoretic accounts that we 
saw in Chapter 1.  
                                               
13 There is controversy about whether non-imagistic imaginings count as imaginings or whether we ought to restrict the 
scope of ‘imaginings’ to refer only to those mental states that include mental imagery. This debate is outside the scope of 




Section I: Kung’s (2010)  
I.A. Terminology:  
 In order to understand Kung’s view, it is necessary to get clear on several pieces of 
terminology that are critical to it. First, an imagining that provides evidence for possibility will be a 
probative imagining.14 Second, to imagistically fs-imagine P is to imagine a scenario of which P is 
true (622). I imagistically imagine that the cat is on the mat in case it is true of my imagined scenario 
that it is. Kung distinguishes two constitutive parts of imagistic imagined scenarios: basic qualitative 
content and assignments. Basic qualitative content consists in “basic observational properties” and 
includes size, shape, color, regions, and surfaces (623).16  For example, if I imagistically imagine 
Barack Obama jogging down the street, I will have a mental image of a rectangular shape with 
yellow stripes and a complexly shaped multi-colored figure situated slightly above that rectangular 
shape. Those shapes, colors, regions (etc.) will be the basic qualitative content of my imagining.  
Assignments are of two kinds: labels and stipulations (624). Labels are what either identify an 
imagined object or identify parts of that object (624). Suppose again that I imagine Barack Obama 
jogging down the street. Assigning the label <Barack Obama> to the figure jogging down the street 
makes it such that the figure is Barack Obama rather than some other person (624). I can also use 
labels to identify parts of him (e.g. I can assign the round sphere towards the top of him the label 
<head>). Here it is important to note that Kung does not endorse any sort of two-step process with 
respect to assigning labels. When I imagine Barack Obama jogging down the street, it is not that I 
imagine a figure and then label that figure <Barack Obama>. Rather, I imagine the jogging figure as 
Barack Obama (624). My imagining of Barack Obama includes both the basic qualitative content 
                                               
14 From hereon I will use the terms ‘probative imagining’ and ‘m-imagining’ interchangeably. In this chapter, both terms 
will refer to an imagining where the depicted content of that imagining has the requisite good-making features for modal 
salience.  
16 Kung relies on an analogous distinction in perception when making this distinction in imagination. Thus, faults of the 




and the label that identifies it, and thus labels are themselves part of my qualitative experience of 
imagining Barack Obama. However, since labels are not themselves basic qualitative content, Kung 
categorizes them as non-basic qualitative content. We can thus think of labels as assigned content 
that is partly constitutive of the qualitative content of our imaginings, because labels are depicted in 
our mental images.17  
The other type of assignment are stipulations, which either make claims about the objects in 
our imagined scenarios or provide background context for those scenarios. Unlike labels, 
stipulations are not part of the qualitative content of our imaginings because they are not depicted in 
those imaginings (625). First there are foreground stipulations, which make claims about the objects 
in our imagined scenarios. For example, if I imagine that Michelle Obama and Anita Hill are out on 
a walk together as friends, that they are friends is a claim about them, but there is nothing about the 
image of Michelle and Anita walking that depicts that friend relation (625). ‘Michelle and Anita are 
friends’ is thus a foreground stipulation. In contrast, background stipulations do not make claims 
about anything in the imagined scenario but instead give us background information about it (625). 
For example, if I imagine that Michelle Obama and Anita Hill are on a walk on a Tuesday, that it is 
Tuesday will be a background stipulation.  
While labels and stipulations are both assignments, labels can be depicted in our imaginings 
while stipulations cannot. For example, suppose again that we imagine Barack Obama. Kung 
endorses a view in which we imagine a figure as Barack Obama rather than imagine something 
depicted that is Barack Obama-like and contextually labeled as such. In this way, that label is part of 
the qualitative content of our imagining. In contrast, recall that ‘that it is Tuesday’ or ‘that Michelle 
                                               
17 Kung’s basic qualitative content/assigned content distinction is largely borrowed from the philosophy of perception. 
Note then that by saying that labels are depicted in our imaginings, Kung is endorsing a not uncontroversial claim in the 
philosophy of perception. Whether things like labels are in fact depicted in either our visual appearances or mental images 




and Anita are friends’ are not imagined as such. They are instead propositions that are predicated of 
our imaginings, but not represented in their imagistic medium. Recall that Kung thinks that there is 
something special about the imagistic medium of certain imaginings that allows those imaginings to 
be probative. When Kung contrasts these imagistic imaginings with non-imagistic imaginings then, 
he takes the latter to be imaginings whose content is purely stipulations (632). 
I.B: Limitations of the Imagination: 
 Kung, contra Gregory and Yablo, allows that we can fs-imagine a posteriori impossibilities 
regardless of whether we are attempting to fs-imagine those impossibilities under certain 
suppositions. His conception of the imagination is thus more liberal than theirs. However, Kung 
does introduce one constraint that he takes to limit our imaginative abilities (629). I name this 
constraint ‘Certainty.’ Certainty says that we will be unable to fs-imagine X if we are absolutely 
certain that X is false (630). 
There are only two types of propositions about whose truth value we can be absolutely 
certain: analytic propositions and statements of conceptual relations (630). To say that we are 
absolutely certain about the truth value of X is to say there is no way that we might be wrong about 
the truth value of X. On this definition, we can be absolutely certain both that analytic truths are 
true and that analytic falsehoods are false (630). For example, there is no way that we might be 
mistaken in thinking that ‘Kevin, an unmarried male, is a bachelor,’ given that a bachelor just is an 
unmarried male. Conversely, there is no way that we could be wrong in thinking that ‘Clark, who is a 
bachelor, is currently married to Carla,’ is false. Since Certainty says that we are unable to fs-imagine 
X if we are absolutely certain that X is false, we can conclude that we are unable to fs-imagine X if X 
is an analytic falsehood.   
 We can likewise be absolutely certain with respect to propositions that describe conceptual 




conceptual relations are true and that propositions that violate conceptual relations are false. By 
‘conceptual relations,’ Kung means instances where a set of higher-level facts has an ‘in virtue of’ 
relation to a set of lower-level facts (630). For example, suppose that Sally is holding a five-fingered 
leaf (631). Suppose that someone asserts that Sally’s leaf is an oval. Since an object is an oval (higher-
level fact) in virtue of its shape (lower-level fact), then a five-fingered shape is not an oval (631). To 
say that Sally’s five-fingered leaf is an oval is thus to violate an ‘in virtue of’ conceptual relation that 
obtain between being a certain shape and being an oval. We can thus be absolutely certain that 
‘Sally’s five-fingered leaf is an oval’ is false (631). According to Certainty, propositions like these that 
violate conceptual relations will also be fs-unimaginable (630-631).  
 Both basic qualitative content and assigned content are restricted by Certainty. Thus, we 
cannot stipulate either that an analytic falsehood or a violation of conceptual relations obtains in our 
imagined scenarios. However, since suppositions are not a type of imagining for Kung, our ability to 
make suppositions is not restricted by Certainty. We can thus suppose both analytic falsehoods and 
propositions that express violations of conceptual relations. Though both suppositions and 
stipulations have propositional content and are not depicted, suppositions are distinct from 
stipulations because they are not restricted by Certainty.  
I.C: Assignments Alone do not Provide Evidence of Possibility  
 Kung argues that solely recognizing that our imaginative abilities are constrained by 
Certainty does not suffice to justify inferences from fs-imaginability to possibility. Inverting 
Certainty, we can say that we will be able to fs-imagine X so long as we find X believable, or true for 
all we know for certain (630). Unlike being absolutely certain about the truth value of X, if we think 
that X is true (or false) for all we know for certain, we leave open the possibility that we might be 




Since the only things about which we can be absolutely certain are analytic falsehoods and 
violations of conceptual relations, we are going to still be able to fs-imagine a posteriori impossibilities. 
For example, ‘Madame Chiang-Kai Shek is Kung’s great-grandmother’ is neither an analytic 
falsehood nor a violation of an ‘in virtue of’ conceptual relation and is therefore fs-imaginable even 
though a posteriori impossible. All I need to do to fs-imagine that proposition is to fs-imagine an 
individual with the label <Madame Chiang-Kai Shek> and make the foreground stipulation that she 
is Kung’s great-grandmother. 
Kung provides even further reason to think that inferring from imaginings that do not 
violate Certainty to claims about possibility is unjustified. In doing so, he underlines how our 
unconstrained ability to make assignments in our imagined scenarios is both what allows us to fs-
imagine things like a posteriori impossibilities and what makes Certainty alone an insufficient 
constraint. Recognizing how imaginings of impossibilities are facilitated by our unconstrained ability 
to make assignments will be critical to understanding the role that both basic qualitative content and 
assigned content play in Kung’s positive view.  
 We saw above that making assignments allowed me to imagine ‘Madame Chiang-Kai Shek is 
Kung’s great-grandmother.’ Recall that according to the inverse of Certainty, we are able to fs-
imagine X so long as we find X believable. Since our ability to make assignments is so liberal, we can 
rephrase the inverse of Certainty to say that we are able to fs-imagine X by assignment so long as we 
find X believable (634). While we surely can fs-imagine things about which we are absolutely certain, 
all we need in order to be able to fs-imagine X by assignment is to meet this lower epistemic 
threshold of finding X believable. However, to find X believable is to fall short of being absolutely 
certain that X, which we can call being non-certain that X (634).18 Suppose that we fs-imagine some 
X by assignment and we find X believable (634). Should we infer from that assignment-based 
                                               




imagining of X to the possibility of X, our fs-imagining would reflect our non-ideal epistemic 
position with respect to X and that imagining would count as evidence that X is possible (634). That 
we are in a non-ideal epistemic position with respect to X should not count as positive evidence that 
X is possible, particularly because one way to be in a non-ideal epistemic position with respect to X 
is to be ignorant of X (634).  
Since assignments are so unconstrained, our lack of absolute certainty that X discounts the 
evidentiary value of our imagining when we fs-imagine X by assignment. Since ‘Madame Chiang-Kai 
Shek is Kung’s great-grandmother’ is neither an analytic falsehood nor a violation of a conceptual 
relation, I cannot be absolutely certain that the proposition is false. I am thus able to imagine that very 
proposition by way of the assignments I made earlier, so long as I find it believable.  
In contrast, suppose that I find it believable that there is some color called chartreuse, but I 
do not know what that color looks like. I can speculate about what it might look like by fs-imagining  
various colors, and I might label one of those various colors <chartreuse>. However even if when 
imagining various colors I happen to imagine chartreuse-basic-qualitative-content itself, that I do so 
does not amount to my successfully imagining chartreuse because I have no idea that the basic 
qualitative content that I have imagined is in fact chartreuse-basic-qualitative content (635). In order to 
successfully imagine chartreuse, I need to both imagine chartreuse-basic-qualitative-content and 
recognize that chartreuse-basic-qualitative-content is in fact what I am imagining. Unlike in the 
‘Madame Chiang-Kai Shek’ case, my being in a less than ideal epistemic position with respect to 
what chartreuse is prevents my imagining chartreuse (635). In this way, the evidentiary value of my 
imaginings that contain basic qualitative content is not damaged by my lack of certainty, because my 
imaginative abilities with respect to basic qualitative content are not so unconstrained as to facilitate 




Since our ability to make assignments is unconstrained enough to facilitate our imagining 
impossibilities, we do not have reason to think that P is possible if P is true in an imagined scenario 
S in virtue of assignment alone. Non-sensory imaginings, which are purely constituted by 
stipulations (a type of assignment), are thus ruled out as guides to possibility. The imagistic 
component of sensory imaginings will be necessary for justifying our inferences from imagining to 
possibility, and it is to Kung’s positive picture of the imagination and the critical role of mental 
imagery in it that I now turn.  
I.D: The Positive View: Gaining Knowledge of Possibility 
 At the center of Kung’s positive view is the idea that the imagistic medium of our imaginings 
justifies our inferences from those imaginings to modal claims. This idea depends primarily on the 
more specific claim that the basic qualitative content of our imagistic imaginings offers prima facie 
evidence of possibility. Kung defends this base claim via analogy to the basic qualitative components 
of our perceptual experiences. For example, suppose that I have a perceptual experience of a blue 
surface in front of me. We would then say that a blue surface could be what is filling the space in 
front me (637). Kung draws a tight analogy between our perceptual and imaginative experiences, 
such that if having the perceptual experience above provides evidence that a blue surface could fill 
the space in front of me, then imagining a blue surface in front of me can likewise provide evidence 
that that is one way the space in front of me could be filled (637).  
I.D.1: Mixed Imaginings:  
 It is critical to Kung’s positive view that basic qualitative content is prima facie probative in 
virtue of its imagistic medium. However, most of our imaginings will be more complex than the 
basic spatial/color properties above and will instead be mixtures of both basic qualitative and 




Kung needs to provide a means of determining whether an imagining is probative when that 
imagining contains assigned content.   
Kung argues that imagistically fs-imagining a scenario S of which a proposition P is true 
provides evidence that P is possible in case both the qualitative and assigned content of S together 
make it intuitive that P is the case in S (640). This is the central thesis of his positive view, and he 
calls it ‘modal evidence from imagination’ (MEI) (640). By ‘intuitive,’ Kung echos Kripke in meaning 
that P is intuitive in S in case, when we grasp P and its relevant concepts, we are rationally compelled 
to judge that P is true in S (640). For example, suppose that I have a black cat, Ravenpaw, and I am 
trying to figure out whether it is possible for someone to have dyed her fur orange. Suppose that I 
imagine a situation in which Ravenpaw’s fur has been dyed orange, which is to say that I imagine a 
situation in which there is a complexly shaped object, and that object is orange. I imagine that object 
as a cat and as Ravenpaw. It is labeled <cat> and <Ravenpaw>. Suppose that it is intuitive to me 
that ‘Ravenpaw’s fur has been dyed orange’ is the case in my imagined scenario. Kung thinks that I 
am thus justified in concluding that Ravenpaw’s fur could have been dyed orange.  
  MEI comes with the important condition that the qualitative content Q of our imagined 
scenario S must play a role in making it intuitive that P is the case in S (640). In other words, it must 
be that without Q, it would not be intuitive that P is the case in S (640). Note here that Kung is 
speaking of ‘qualitative content’ instead of ‘basic qualitative content’ as playing this critical role (639) 
‘Qualitative content’ includes both basic and non-basic qualitative content, and thus allows that 
labels, in addition to basic qualitative content, can play a critical role in making it intuitive that P is 
the case in S. MEI thus does not require that assigned content be entirely set aside, especially since 
our imaginings almost always contain it. Rather, this condition is meant to exclude imaginings in 
which stipulations alone make it intuitive that in P is the case in S. Stipulations are not constitutive 




too unconstrained for us to infer from a stipulation-based imagining (i.e. which is the equivalent of 
inferring from an assignment alone) to a claim about possibility.   
 While labels are closely tethered to the basic qualitative content that they identify, they are 
still assignments, and we have already seen that our ability to make labels is likewise unconstrained. 
In order for imaginings that contain both basic qualitative content and labels to be suitable guides to 
possibility then, we need to provide independent evidence that something we have labeled could in 
fact take on the labels we have given it (642). Kung defines this evidence-providing process as 
‘authentication’ (642) Authentication is critical to Kung’s positive view because it is the process by 
which we need to justify all of the assignments in an imagining before that imagining can be 
probative (642).  
Prior to seeing how we might go about authenticating a label, it is necessary to note that each 
object that we imagine entails an existential claim (643). For example, my imagining of Ravenpaw 
entails that there is something in my imagined scenario that is Ravenpaw: ∃X(IsRavenpaw(X)). 
When we authenticate, we do not need to authenticate that there is some object (∃X). We have 
gathered as much from basic qualitative content (643). What we need to authenticate is that the ∃X 
could take on the identity <Ravenpaw> (643).  
There are two ways we can go about authenticating. On the one hand, we can provide 
evidence that our object could take on the label we have given it by appealing to states of affairs in 
the actual world (642). I can do this with respect to the case above. Since Ravenpaw exists in the 
actual world, it suffices to authenticate ∃X(IsRavenpaw(X)) for me to point to my actual cat, 
Ravenpaw.  
We cannot get by with this means of authentication alone though, because oftentimes we 
imagine situations that contain non-actual things whose identity we clearly cannot authenticate by 




this purpose Kung introduces a recursive step. First, we imagine a scenario in which there is some 
object ‘X’ where the label ‘X’ refers to something non-actual (e.g. Santa Claus) and we have 
stipulated that the object takes on the label X.19 In order to authenticate this label, we perform a 
recursive step that consists in imagining an additional scenario in which it is intuitive that our 
imagined object is X, where the qualitative content of our imagining is essential to making it intuitive 
that our imagined object is X (653). In other words, we authenticate our assignment via imagining 
another scenario that 1) contains our assignment and 2) of which MEI holds. It is the fact that we 
are imagining another scenario and evaluating that scenario for adherence to MEI that makes this 
step a recursion.  
For example, suppose that we want to find out whether I could have had a second cat (653). 
In order for an imagining of this situation to provide evidence of its possibility, we need to make it 
intuitive that I have a second cat without stipulating that very thing. Suppose that I first imagine a 
scenario in which I am feeding both Ravenpaw and another cat. In this imagining, the only way to 
make it intuitive that the second cat is my cat (rather than, e.g., a friend’s cat or a stray cat) is to 
stipulate it as such. I am thus not yet justified in taking this imagining to be probative. I need to 
imagine a different scenario where the qualitative content of my imagining plays a necessary role in 
making it intuitive that the second cat is in fact my cat.  
One way to do this is to imagine the origin story of my acquiring the second cat. I can 
imagine going to the animal shelter, picking up the cat and signing the required paperwork. I can 
imagine bringing the cat home, registering it with the vet, naming it, introducing it to Ravenpaw, and 
so on. Assuming that I authenticate the many other assignments in these scenarios (e.g. that there is 
(∃X)(IsRavenpaw(X)), and so on, mostly by appeal to the actual world) we should find it intuitive 
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purposes, we need only recognize that we can imagine non-actual things and that the non-actual things in our imaginings 




that in my first imagining in which I am feeding both Ravenpaw and the other cat, that other cat is 
my cat. I have authenticated the label <GenaesSecondCat> in my first imagining via the recursion 
that took me through those other imaginings. Since my non-actual label has been authenticated, I 
am justified in concluding that I could have had a second cat.  
There are two final requirements that must hold of probative imaginings. First, they must be 
literal, not metaphorical (656). For example, we might imagine metaphorically that Russia is a bear 
(656). However, we must exclude cases like these wherein we imagine representations of the object 
in question rather than the object itself from being modally salient (656). Here we are imagining a 
representation of Russia as a bear, not literally imagining that Russia is a bear, and we have no reason 
to think that a representation of X gives us any insight as to how X could be (e.g. Suppose that I 
imagine that a painting of Barack Obama spontaneously combusts. Even if my imagining is 
probative, it does not provide evidence that Barack Obama could spontaneously combust).  
The last condition for MEI is as follows: “there cannot be some R such that either that (a) R 
follows ‘from assignment alone’ yet it is intuitive that not-R; or (b) it is intuitive that R and intuitive 
that not-R (654).” For example, suppose that I imagine that Sally is holding a leaf and it is intuitive 
to me that the leaf is five-fingered. Suppose that I then stipulate that the leaf is an oval. Even if in 
other cases basic qualitative content makes it probative that some X is an oval, in this case it is 
already intuitive to me that Sally’s leaf is not an oval. I cannot authenticate my stipulation that it is an 
oval, because any origin story that I tell about how the leaf came to be an oval will be counteracted 
by the fact that I antecedently find it intuitive that the leaf is not an oval. 
I.E: Complex Images  
Kung admits that his imagistic account must accommodate the fact that we seem to be 
unable to form clear mental images of complex objects. He addresses this problem by taking up 




like a one-thousand sided figure where our mental image is distinct enough to actually resemble a 
one-thousand sided figure (646). Endorsing Kung’s framework allows us to be able to say that we 
can imagine a chiliagon by stipulation. However, if we take that route, then the qualitative content of 
our imagining is not playing any role in making it intuitive that our imagining is of a chiliagon and 
our imagining therefore cannot be probative. This is a problem because we have independent reason 
to think that chiliagons are possible and as such, they should be probatively imaginable.  
 Kung resolves this case by what introducing he calls “imaginative induction (647).” It is best 
to first consider how imaginative induction works with respect to simple cases. For example, 
imagine a triangle (647). Now imagine inserting an additional side into the triangle, thereby creating a 
square (647). I can imagine a triangle without stipulation, and my imagining of inserting the 
additional side to the triangle is also qualitative (perhaps I imagine one of the triangle’s points 
‘opening up’ as two sides swing away from each other, to make room for another side to fit between 
them). Since qualitative content thus plays a part in making it intuitive that I am now imagining a 
square, my imagining of that square provides evidence that there could be a square.  
Kung uses this procedure for the chiliagon case. Suppose that we imagine an n-sided figure 
where n is a significantly large number (e.g. 1000), such that we cannot form a distinct mental image 
of the n-sided figure (647). Here Kung is willing to grant that if we imagine an n-sided figure, we do 
so because we stipulated it (647). Now suppose that we imagine inserting one side into our n-sided 
figure, thereby forming an n+1-sided figure.  
Kung argues that the fact that we now imagine an n+1-sided figure instead of an n-sided 
figure does not follow from stipulations (647). We can have a mental image of an additional side (i.e. 
a line segment), and we can picture inserting that line segment into our n-sided figure, even if we 
cannot form a clear mental image of that n-sided figure (647). Just as in the triangle-to-square case, 




basic qualitative content, and basic qualitative content is prima facie probative. In order be justified in 
thinking that our imagining of an n+1-sided figure is probative then, we have to authenticate our 
initial stipulation that there is an n-sided figure. If we cannot authenticate that stipulation, then we 
have no reason to think that an n+1-sided figure is possible, even if the move that we made to get to 
a n+1-sided figure from an n-sided figure did not rely on stipulation.  
Kung argues that we can authenticate our stipulation that there is an n-sided figure via the 
same recursive step that we use in authentication. We can imagine an n-sided figure by following the 
same process that we followed in imagining an n+1-sided figure. We imagine an n-1-sided figure and 
imagine inserting one side, making it an n-sided figure. Given that our imagining of that insertion 
contains basic qualitative content, we arrive at an imagining of an n-sided figure without relying on 
stipulation. Now it is the status of the n-1-figure that we need to check. If we can imagine the n-1-
figure without relying on stipulation, then there is no problem. Our imagining of the n-1-sided figure 
would be probative. Since we have authenticated the one assignment that we needed to make in 
order to imagine an n-sided figure, we are justified in concluding that we have evidence that there 
could be such a figure.  
Suppose that, contrary to the procedure above, we also need to stipulate that there is an n-1-
sided figure. We would then need repeat the recursion procedure. We imagine an n-2-sided figure 
and then imagine adding one side, and so on. Once we have authenticated our stipulation that there 
is an n-2-sided figure, we are justified in concluding that there could be an n-1-sided figure, which 
justifies us in concluding that there could be an n-sided figure, etc. It is in this way that we are 
supposed to be able to authenticate the stipulations that facilitate our imagining of figures with 
multiple sides, like chiliagons. Kung grants that once n becomes a significantly large number, the 




differ. He simply requires that “there just has to be enough qualitative content to make it clear that, 
given that it is an n-1-sided figure, after the change it is an n-sided figure (648).”  
Suppose that we imagine a 1799-sided figure by stipulation and that we authenticate that 
stipulation by going through a (likely very long) recursion. We might think that Kung’s clarification 
above mandates that in order for there to be enough qualitative content to make it clear that my 
1799-sided figure is now a 1800-sided figure, there would need to be some way for me to tell the 
difference (however small) between my imagining of the first figure and my imagining of the latter. 
However, it seems implausible that I could in fact accomplish this given the complexity of the 
figures. Here Kung would argue that imagining the qualitative content that is the additional side and 
imagining inserting it into the 1799-sided figure suffices to make it clear to me that I now have an 
1800-sided figure instead of a 1799-sided one. I need not be able to distinguish the qualitative 
content of my imagining of a 1799-sided figure from the qualitative content of my imagining of the 
1800-sided one in order for the qualitative content of the additional side to make it clear to me that, 
since I inserted that additional side into my 1799-sided figure, that figure now has 1800 sides.  
MEI succeeds in accommodating imaginings of complex figures. That it likewise provides a 
tenable means by which to evaluate both imaginings with mixed content and imaginings that depict 
non-actual things makes it a fruitful line of reasoning. MEI thus constitutes one image-based view 
that I will take up against competing error theoretic accounts in Chapter III.  
Section II: An Alternative Imagistic View: Gregory (2019) 
 In this section, I present Gregory’s (2019) imagistic account. In my explication of Gregory’s 
view, I focus on a justificatory distinction that appears to be doing most of the work in allowing him 
to make a cut between those imaginings that are probative and those that are not. I first summarize 
Gregory’s introduction of the justificatory distinction with respect to vision. I proceed to explain the 




reason to think that the same justificatory distinction that applies to visual appearances also applies 
to mental imagery. I then show how that justificatory distinction allows Gregory to block certain of 
our imaginings from being probative.  
 Though our visual systems reliably orient us in our surroundings, things can sometimes go 
awry. When I have an eye infection for example, the way things appear to me will most likely not 
reflect how they actually are. Gregory distinguishes cases like these from successful uses of my visual 
system by introducing what he calls ‘visual reliability conditions’ (3). I employ my visual system 
under visual reliability conditions in case the way things look to me “tends to be the way things are 
around [my] perspective (3).” A given group of conditions suffices to be visual reliability conditions 
in case whichever appearances my visual system generates under those conditions tend to be 
accurate (3).20 Since visual reliability conditions tend to ensure the accuracy of my visual experiences, 
I am prima facie justified in concluding that any visual experience I have under visual reliability 
conditions will yield a representation of how the world around me actually is. For example, if I have 
a visual experience of my cat, Ravenpaw, sitting in front of me and I have good reason to think that 
I am having that experience under visual reliability conditions, I am prima facie justified in believing 
that Ravenpaw is in fact sitting in front of me.   
Gregory claims that we have reason to think that we are visually discerning enough to 
recognize when we are having a visual experience that is not under visual reliability conditions. We 
will recognize when we are not under visual reliability conditions via recognizing unusual 
phenomenological features of our visual experiences (7). For example, I will be immediately wary of 
the accuracy of my visual system if I notice that any visual experiences that I have via my left eye are 
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(4). However, Gregory thinks that there is a lot to be said a posteriori about the kinds of conditions that ensure visual 
accuracy. He illustrates this when he says: “the forces of optics, neurophysiology, and perceptual psychology are 
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blurry, as they would be if I had an eye infection. Recognizing that phenomenological feature will 
suffice for me to recognize that I do not enjoy visual reliability conditions (i.e. my eye is infected!) 
That we are good visual discerners suffices to give us reason to think that most of our visual 
experiences (i.e. the ones that do not strike us as phenomenologically aberrant) do in fact occur 
under some set of visual reliability conditions. If this is the case, then we are prima facie justified in 
taking the majority of our visual experiences to be accurate with respect to how the world around us 
actually is.  
However, to say that I am prima facie justified in accepting the accuracy of my visual 
experiences is not to say that I have straightforward justification for doing so. For example, suppose 
that I have a visual experience of my cat, Ravenpaw, sitting in front of me. To say that I am prima 
facie justified in taking that visual experience to be accurate is to say that I am justified in believing 
that Ravenpaw is in front of me so long as I have no reason to doubt the accuracy of my visual 
experience (4). In contrast, to say that I have straightforward justification for believing that 
Ravenpaw is in front of me is to say that I have good reason to think that the accuracy of my visual 
experience will not be proved otherwise.  
Gregory calls the set of things that prove our visual experiences to be non-accurate and thus 
block our prima facie justification from becoming straightforward justification ‘defeating 
considerations (4).’ For example, suppose that on a given afternoon I enjoy several visual 
experiences under conditions that are normally visually reliable (4). However, suppose that later that 
evening, I find out that I have been hallucinating (4). Gregory argues that while I am prima facie 
justified in taking whatever visual experiences I had during my hallucination to represent the world 




blocks my prima facie justification from converting to straightforward justification for accepting that 
the visual experiences I had all afternoon represent what was in fact the case.21  
 Prior to seeing how this justificatory distinction in vision also applies to the imagination, it is 
necessary to get clear on a final definition. When a visual appearance looks a certain way under 
visual reliability conditions, we can say that that visual appearance is reliability compatible (5). This is 
to say that if I have a visual experience of Ravenpaw sitting in front of me and I enjoy visual 
reliability conditions, it follows that the way it looks for Ravenpaw to be sitting in front of me is 
reliability compatible (5). Recognizing whether things are reliability compatible will be important 
because doing so is what will guide us towards knowledge of possibility.  
 We are now in a position to see how the claims above about vision apply to the imagination. 
Suppose that I imagistically imagine a pink horse (5). My mental image is an image of a pink horse 
because it shows things as looking as certain way (5). Gregory asks us to then see whether we can 
imagine a possible world in which there is some subject who is having a visual experience under 
visual reliability conditions, where the way things look to her is the way my mental image of the pink 
horse shows things as looking (5). Plausibly, we can in fact imagine such a possible world.  
Given that the possible world contains a subject who is having a visual experience under 
visual reliability conditions, we can say that the possible world contains some X, the appearance of 
which is reliability compatible (6). Since the way things appear to her is the way my mental image of 
a pink horse shows things as looking, I am prima facie justified in thinking that in that possible world, 
                                               
21 We might think that finding out that I have been hallucinating blocks me from being even prima facie justified in 
thinking that my visual experiences during my hallucination yield accurate appearances (4). On this view, my visual 
experience occurs in a manner that automatically rules out the accuracy of any appearances that it yields (5). Gregory 
recognizes that there are in fact two options with respect to what defeators can do: they can block our prima facie 
justification from converting to straightforward justification or they can make us recognize that we were not prima facie 
justified in the first place (5). He endorses the first of those two disjuncts because doing so makes his responses to 
certain objections more parsimonious (5). In doing so, he takes it that the entirety of his positive view could be rewritten 
on an endorsement of the second disjunct instead of the first and yield the same positive conclusion (albeit reached via a 
lengthier and more wordy argument). It should also be noted that Gregory does not take the strength of his view to turn 




there is a pink horse, the appearance of which is reliability compatible (6). Given that there is a 
possible world of which we are prima facie justified in concluding that there are pink horses, we are 
prima facie justified in concluding that pink horses are possible (6).  
 Thus on Gregory’s view, we begin with a mental image in which things are depicted in a 
particular way. We then determine whether we are justified in thinking that the way things look in 
our mental image is reliability-compatible. Making this determination amounts to determining 
whether we can imagine a possible world where things look that way to a subject who enjoys visual 
reliability conditions. If we can do this, we can then conclude that there is a possible world in which 
there is some X, the appearance of which is reliability compatible. Since our visual image displays 
things as looking like that (i.e. like they do to the subject in the possible world) we are justified in 
concluding that what our visual image displays is possible.  
We are thus justified in thinking that recognizing certain visual images (where the contents 
of those images are reliability-compatible) will guide us towards knowledge of possibilities. In this 
way, our prima facie justification with respect to the accuracy of our visual appearances under visual 
reliability conditions is what justifies us in taking certain visual images to portray possibilities. Given 
that we are only prima facie justified, we will have to determine whether there are any defeating 
considerations around before we can take ourselves to be straightforwardly justified in inferring 
from our visual images to modal claims.  
III: Conclusion  
 Both Kung and Gregory make clear that the depicted content of our mental images must 
have certain features in order for us to be justified in forming modal beliefs on the basis of those 
images. For Kung, our images must be authenticated and for Gregory, we must have reason to think 
that what our images display is reliability compatible. We thus err in ascribing possibility to our 




compatible. This contrasts with error theoretic lines of reasoning, in which our modal errors arise 
when we take ourselves to be imagining X in a modally salient way when we are in fact not 
imagining X at all (i.e. we are in fact imagining something like X1).  
 Further, we saw in the first chapter that both Gregory (2004) and Yablo (1993) pick out a 
certain type of imagining as the modally salient one (i.e. m-imagining). M-imagining is supposed to 
be constrained such that impossibilities are m-unimaginable, which gives us reason to think that 
what is m-imaginable will be possible. Contra this line of reasoning, neither Kung nor Gregory 
(2019) take m-imagining to be a specific type of imaginative mental act that contrasts with fs-
imagining. Rather, imagining is one mental act and certain of our imaginings are probative in virtue 
of their good-making features. So, while Kung and Gregory (2019) do pick out a set of imaginings 
that are probative, they are not probative in virtue of the fact that we imagine them in a different 
way than we do their non-probative counterparts.  
 In this chapter, we have seen two tenable imagistic accounts of the imagination as a guide to 
knowledge of possibilities. Unlike the error theoretic accounts, neither imagistic account appears 
vulnerable to anything like a ‘modal conclusions first’ charge. Since they are instead epistemically 
non-circular in and of themselves, it may seem as though we ought to prefer them.  
 In the next chapter, I will argue that both imagistic accounts are subject to problems that 
ultimately make them worse off than the error theoretic accounts. In order to do so, I evaluate how 
all of the accounts fare when confronted with what I define as test cases. While the imagistic 
accounts provide successful evaluations of the test cases, they do so via an error theoretic move 
rather than by identifying modally salient features in imagistic imaginings of the cases. The imagistic 
nature of the accounts instead weakens their evaluations of the test cases due to uncertainties about 
what counts as a mental image of each case. So, while the two imagistic accounts are epistemically 




CHAPTER III: TEST CASES 
A good-making feature of any account of the imagination as a guide to knowledge of 
possibilities is its ability to confront what I categorize as test cases. Test cases will be either 
propositions or images that we have reason to think are not possible. As such, a successful account 
of the imagination ought to classify these cases as not imaginable in the modally salient way.  
 One type of test case is propositions about which we have no prior modal knowledge.  
Previously, we saw how both error theoretic and imagistic accounts fared when classifying both 
propositions that we had reason to think are possible and propositions that we had reason to think 
are impossible. If a given account classified as probative imaginings of propositions that we had 
independent reason to think are possible and excluded from that set imaginings of propositions that 
we had independent reason to think are impossible, we had reason to think that the account in 
question would fare well when confronted with cases about which we have no antecedent modal 
knowledge. Taking up modally uncertain propositions is one way of seeing whether those otherwise 
successful accounts can in fact help us in situations where we have no independent modal 
knowledge.  
Another type of test case is mental images that depict impossibilities. These mental images 
include depictions of things like Escher Staircases and Penrose Triangles. In earlier sections, we saw 
how two imagistic accounts fared when classifying mental images that depict things that we had 
reason to think are possible. Both accounts manage to classify mental images of possible things as 
probative by picking out features of those images that justify us in ascribing possibility to them. 
However, neither account is explicit about how lacking such possibility-making features might either 
block an ascription of possibility to an image or require an ascription of impossibility to it. We might 
think that if an account classifies as probative imaginings of objects that we have independent 




classifying images of depicted impossibilities as impossible. Just as with modally uncertain 
propositions, evaluating images that depict impossibilities is one way to see whether those otherwise 
successful accounts can in fact help us in this harder scenario. Further, since the error theoretic 
accounts canvassed in the first chapter focus on propositional imaginings and do not provide 
explicit evaluations of mental images, taking up such a case is a good means of seeing whether those 
accounts can make the correct classifications in that respect as well.  
In this chapter, I argue that error theoretic accounts are best equipped to handle both types 
of test cases. In order to do so, I take up an example of each type of test case in sequence. The first 
case is a proposition about whose modal status we are unsure, while the second case is an image 
whose contents depict an impossibility. At the beginning of each section, I explicate the case in 
question and make clear what a successful evaluation of it ought to look like. I then present Dominic 
Gregory’s (2004) and Stephen Yablo’s (1993) error theoretic evaluations and Peter Kung’s (2010) 
and Dominic Gregory’s (2019) imagistic evaluations of it. At the end of each section, I identify the 
account(s) that I take to handle the case most successfully. While all four accounts meet the burden 
of proof for both of these cases, it turns out that imagistic accounts only do so by relying upon an 
error theoretic maneuver. As a result, I conclude that error theoretic lines of reasoning are best 
equipped to handle the test cases.  
As we saw in the two previous chapters, all four of the accounts pick out a set of imaginings 
that are modally salient. I will continue to use m-imaginings to refer to these modally salient 
imaginings and fs-imaginings to refer to full stop, non-modally salient imaginings. Since each of the 
four accounts characterize m-imaginings in a different way, I will indicate which imaginings are m-






Section 1: Goldbach’s Conjecture:  
The first test case is Goldbach’s Conjecture (GC). GC states that every even number greater 
than two can be expressed as the sum of two prime numbers. While GC is unproven, it is necessary 
if true and if impossible if false. Thus, if GC is possible, then not-GC is impossible and if GC is 
impossible, then not-GC is necessary.  
Prior to looking at what the respective error theoretic and imagistic accounts have to say 
about GC, it is necessary to get clear on what exactly the burden of proof is. I argue that in order to 
provide a successful evaluation of GC, a given account ought to:  
1. Classify GC as modally undecidable and;  
2. Not rely upon a posteriori modal knowledge in order to do so.  
 
Per (1), it is not that the accounts must give us reason to conclude either that GC is possible 
or that GC is impossible. Given that GC is necessary if possible and necessary things are actual, an 
account that concludes that GC is possible ought to provide us with an m-imagining of an actual 
proof of GC. However, requiring that the imagination provide us with an m-imagining of an actual 
proof of GC sets the burden of proof too high. GC is unproven and so a proof of it is unknown, 
but its proof will be an a priori proposition and a priori propositions are only m-imaginable when they 
are known. Absent recognizing the conceptual relations constitutive of a given a priori proposition, 
we will lack knowledge of it. So too recognizing those conceptual relations is necessary for m-
imagining it.  
For example, we would not think that someone who lacks knowledge of the conceptual 
relation between ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried’ can m-imagine the a priori truth ‘that the bachelors on 
the park bench are unmarried’ where the word ‘bachelor’ corresponds to our concept of bachelor. In 
other words, she cannot m-imagine that very proposition if she does not know that bachelors are 




bachelors will be m-unimaginable to her until she recognizes the conceptual relations between being 
a bachelor and being unmarried.  
Similarly, our lack of knowledge of the conceptual relations constitutive of a proof of GC 
prevents us from being able to m-imagine the a priori truth (the proof of GC) constituted by those 
very conceptual relations. We will thus be unable to m-imagine an actual proof of GC until we have 
knowledge of an actual proof of GC. This same line of reasoning applies to the conclusion that GC 
is impossible. If GC is impossible then not-GC is necessary and therefore actual. As such, if we 
require an account to conclude that GC is impossible then the account ought to provide us with an 
m-imagining of an actual proof of not-GC but again, since not-GC too is unknown that is likewise 
an unrealistic burden of proof.  
While the imagination need not provide us with an actual proof of GC, this does not rule 
out what it can provide as helpful. Rather, our inability to m-imagine unknown a priori propositions 
reveals that our imagination is not so unconstrained as to facilitate our m-imagining just any 
proposition regardless of which conceptual relations we recognize. Thus if an account successfully 
classifies both GC and not-GC as m-unimaginable we have good reason to conclude that the 
account in question has the correct constraints on our imaginative abilities. We then have further 
justification for taking propositions that we can m-imagine on that account as being probative.  
Prior to proceeding, it is important to recognize that per (2) we are justified in relying on 
antecedent modal knowledge of propositions known a priori. Recall that in Chapter 1 we established 
this on the grounds that we can recognize both the truth value and the modal status of a priori 
propositions solely in virtue of grasping the conceptual relations constitutive of those propositions. 
In contrast, we have no such independent source of modal knowledge with respect to a posteriori 
propositions. Contra appeals to a priori modal knowledge then, to appeal to a posteriori modal 




whether the imagination is a trustworthy provider of modal knowledge. Given that this move is 
epistemically circular, while a successful account of the imagination as a modal epistemological tool 
can appeal to antecedent a priori modal knowledge, it cannot appeal to antecedent a posteriori modal 
knowledge.  
I.A: Error Theoretic Solutions  
I.A.1: Gregory (2004): 
 In Chapter 1, we took up Gregory’s unshakeable imaginability line of reasoning as a potential 
guide to knowledge of possibility. Recall that according to Gregory, no impossible and accessible 
non-modal proposition is supposed to be unshakeably imaginable (i.e. m-imaginable), and a 
proposition is not unshakeably imaginable in case we are unable to fs-imagine it under at least one 
supposition. Recall also that an accessible proposition is a proposition whose truth value we would 
know were we to be aptly situated such that we could determine it.  
Though GC is unknown, its unknown status does not make it inaccessible. Rather, to be 
situated such that we could determine the truth value of GC would be to possess knowledge of the 
conceptual relations constitutive of a proof of GC. While we do not yet possess the conceptual 
knowledge necessary to be in such a position, this does not mean that there is no such position.  
 Since we gain knowledge of GC a priori, we ought to refer to the line of reasoning that 
Gregory uses with respect to a priori propositions. According to Gregory, for every a priori 
impossibility P there is a convincing demonstration of not-P (338). A convincing demonstration of 
not-P consists in an argument that not-P where we could never fs-imagine that one of the 
argument’s premises fails or that one of its inferences leads from truth to falsity (337). For example, 
take the proposition that ‘some barber shaves all and only barbers who are not self-shavers.’ That 
proposition is a priori impossible. Further, we can create a convincing demonstration of its negation 




who shaves all and only barbers who are not self-shavers either shaves or does not shave himself. 
However, if that barber shaves himself, he does not shave himself (remember that he shaves only 
barbers who are not self-shavers!) and therefore our barber does not shave himself. Yet if that 
barber does not shave himself, he shaves himself (since then he is not a self-shaver and thus must 
shave himself). Thus, if there is a barber who shaves all and only barbers who are not self-shavers, 
that barber both shaves and does not shave himself.  
 The argument above constitutes a convincing demonstration that it is not the case that there 
is a barber who shaves all and only barbers who are not self-shavers. We could never fs-imagine that 
one of the arguments’ premises is false nor could we fs-imagine that one of its inferences leads from 
truth to falsity. If this is the case, then making the non-modal, accessible supposition that the 
argument above exists will render us unable to fs-imagine that there is some barber who shaves all 
and only those barbers who are not self-shavers.  
 Recall that since GC is necessary if true, either GC or not-GC will turn out to be impossible. 
We thus need either a convincing demonstration of GC or a convincing demonstration of not-GC 
in order to recognize one of them as impossible. However, I take it that a convincing demonstration 
of GC (or not-GC) must consist in a proof that GC (or not-GC) is true. Acquiring the convincing 
demonstration that we need in order to recognize the impossibility of either GC or not-GC thus 
requires us to have the very thing that we set out to look for in the first place: evidence of the 
actuality (which is a fortiori evidence of the possibility) of GC (or not-GC).  
 Given that we do not have a convincing demonstration of not-GC, we do not have a 
supposition under which we can shake our fs-imagining of GC. As such, we are not justified in 
concluding that GC is impossible. However, we also do not have reason to think that GC will be 




GC is unshakeably imaginable then there ought to be a convincing demonstration of GC, and we 
have already seen that we do not have this convincing demonstration either.  
However, our lack of knowledge of the convincing demonstration that we need in order to 
ascribe either possibility or impossibility to GC does not justify us in assuming that there is neither a 
convincing demonstration for not-GC nor a convincing demonstration for GC. Since we cannot 
rule out either that it is possible that there is a convincing demonstration of not-GC or that it is 
possible that there is a convincing demonstration of GC, we are not justified in taking a stance as to 
whether it will be GC or not-GC that turns out to be unshakeably imaginable and therefore possible.  
 GC thus comes out neither as impossible nor as possible on Gregory’s account and so we 
ought to conclude that it is modally undecidable. As such, his account meets (1). Since he does not 
rely upon any a posteriori modal knowledge, he does so without violating (2).  
I.A.2: Yablo:  
On Yablo’s (1993) view, I am justified in concluding that P is possible in case I can fs-
imagine a world that I take to verify P (29). To fs-imagine a world that I take to verify P is thus to 
m-imagine P.  In contrast, I am justified in concluding that P is impossible in case I cannot fs-
imagine any world that I do not take to falsify P (29). The modal status of P is undecidable if I fail to 
m-imagine either what is needed to justify a belief in P’s possibility or what is needed to justify a 
belief in P’s impossibility. In other words, I am justified in concluding that P is undecidable if I can 
neither fs-imagine a world that verifies P nor fs-imagine worlds that I do not take to falsify P (29).  
 Yablo argues that Goldbach’s Conjecture (GC) is one such undecidable case. First, we will 
be unable to fs-imagine a world that we do not take to falsify GC (i.e. a world that verifies not-GC) 
and thus cannot conclude that GC is impossible. This is because every scenario that we can fs-
imagine falls short of being a scenario in which not-GC is veridical (29). For example, suppose that a 




a counterexample to GC (i.e. the number cannot be expressed as the sum of two primes). On 
Yablo’s view, that imagined scenario does not justify us in concluding that not-GC is possible 
because it could also be true of the scenario that N was erroneously recognized as a counterexample to 
GC. He concludes from this that the veridicality of the computer printing out a number N as a 
counterexample does not depend on there being a world in which N is in fact a counterexample to 
GC. We can imagine that a computer does that even in a possible world in which there are no actual 
counterexamples to GC and all apparent counterexamples are erroneously recognized as such. 
 Suppose that instead of attempting to m-imagine a number N that is a counterexample to 
GC, we attempt to m-imagine a computer producing an elaborate proof of not-GC. Such a proof 
cannot be erroneously hailed as such if it is in fact a proof. However, Yablo argues that we will not 
be able to m-imagine a proof that is in fact a correct proof of not-GC. He claims that, “given that it 
is inconceivable to me that addition facts should vary between possible worlds, my ability to imagine 
the proof as correct is limited by my confidence that some number is in fact unavailable as the sum of 
two primes. Alas I have no idea whether such a number exists and neither (I assume) does anyone 
else (32; first italics mine, second italics from original).”  
According to Yablo, we will be unable to m-imagine a correct proof of not-GC unless we are 
confident that a number is in fact unavailable as the sum of two primes. However, we will be 
confident of this only when this number is known. Absent this knowledge, we will not be confident 
that this number in fact exists.  
Similarly, we cannot fs-imagine a world that we do not take to falsify not-GC. In order to do 
this, we would have to fs-imagine a world of which GC is veridical.22 Just as before, we can do this 
by trying to fs-imagine a world in which there is a proof of GC. In order for our proof to give us 
reason to think that GC is possible, it will have to be convincing. However, the only way for our 
                                               




imagined proof to be convincing is if we fs-imagine it as such and Yablo points out that stipulating 
in our imagining that a proof is convincing does not make it such that the proof is actually 
convincing (32). Again, we will only find a given proof actually convincing if we are confident in it in 
fact being correct (i.e. in fact being a priori true) and we will only be confident in that if the proof 
itself is known.  
Since we can neither fs-imagine a world that we take to verify not-GC, nor fs-imagine a 
world that we do not take to falsify not-GC, we must conclude that not-GC is modally undecidable. 
Since the modal status of not-GC is undecidable, then so is the modal status of GC. Yablo’s account 
thus succeeds in meeting (1) and since it does not rely upon a posteriori modal knowledge to do so, 
also meets (2).  
I.B: Imagistic Solutions 
I.B.1: Kung:  
 In order to evaluate the modal status of GC on Kung’s account, it is necessary to have a 
mental image of it. Kung takes all non-imagistic imaginings to not be probative and so we cannot 
begin to evaluate GC without forming this mental image. If we accept that we cannot form a mental 
image of GC then the extent to which Kung’s account can help us stops here.  
Since it is controversial whether we can in fact form such an image, I take it to be more 
useful to assume that forming such an image is possible. One way of doing so would be to fs-
imagine one of the two scenarios that Yablo canvassed in the previous section. We could fs-imagine 
a computer printing out a proof of GC.23  
                                               
23 I have chosen this particular mental image because I take it to depict one way that a proof of GC might come to be. 
Recall that in Chapter 2, Kung explicated that one way of authenticating the assignments in our images is to recursively 
imagine some kind of origin story about the assignments. For example, I authenticated the assignment 
<GenaesSecondCat> in my mental image of myself holding two cats by imagining picking the cat up from the shelter, 
bringing it home, and so forth. With respect to the GC case, suppose that I try to form a mental image of GC by 
imagining looking at whiteboard on which there is a proof of GC. In order for the proof on the whiteboard to be a 
proof of GC, I must stipulate it. In order to authenticate that assignment, I would presumably have to recursively 




 Even if we accept that this mental image is in fact a mental image of GC, it will not count as 
probative. This is to say that we will not be able to fs-imagine it without stipulating that the proof is 
a proof of GC. While Kung allows probative imaginings to have stipulations so long as we 
authenticate them, I argue that we will be unable to authenticate our stipulations in this image. This 
is to say that even if the image is in fact an image of GC, it will lack the requisite good-making 
features for being an m-imagining of GC.   
Recall that on Kung’s account, an m-imagining of X is one in which it is intuitive that X, 
where the qualitative content of that imagining is necessary to it being intuitive that X. If in a given 
imagining we need to stipulate X, we can authenticate that imagining by fs-imagining another 
scenario in which it is intuitive that X. That recursive imagining then authenticates our assignment 
that X in our original imagining.  
 Suppose that we fs-imagine the scenario in which a computer prints out a proof of GC. In 
order to do so, we stipulate that the proof is a proof of GC. One way to authenticate this stipulation 
is to appeal to actual world states of affairs, but we cannot do this because of course there is no 
existent proof of GC. We thus need to utilize Kung’s method for authenticating assignments of 
non-actual things. That is, we need to recursively fs-imagine a scenario in which it is intuitive that 
GC and the qualitative content of the scenario is necessary for eliciting that intuition. 
We might think that we can do this by fs-imagining a proof of GC coming to be (where the 
qualitative content of our imaginings is necessary for making it intuitive that GC is coming to be in 
them) because this will make it intuitive that the proof in our original imagining is in fact a proof of 
GC. This recursive authentication would then make it such that our original imagining is an m-
imagining of GC. In order to do this, we might fs-imagine someone inputting certain algorithms into 
                                               
one way that a proof of GC might come to be, I thus begin with the kind of mental image that has the best chance of 




a computer, fs-imagine a group of mathematicians coming up with the correct inputs, and so on. 
However, even in these recursive imaginings, plausibly the only way that we can fs-imagine any one 
of those factors being a factor that in fact leads to a correct proof of GC (rather than to some 
erroneous proof) is if we stipulate it as such.  
In order to see how this is the case, it is first necessary to determine in what kind of 
imagined content the symbols that constitute a proof of GC consist. Plausibly, bare depictions of 
mathematical symbols consist in basic qualitative content. They are no more than basic lines and 
shapes. However, this is compatible with us fs-imagining each of those mathematical symbols as 
numbers (i.e. in the same way that we imagine some amalgamation of basic qualitative content as 
Barack Obama). For example, those of us who are familiar with our mathematical system assign the 
basic qualitative content ‘2’ the label ‘two.’ We fs-imagine the symbol ‘2’ as ‘two’ and we authenticate 
that label by appealing to our knowledge of our mathematical system. Our imaginings of ‘2’, consist 
in the basic qualitative content of the symbol and the non-basic qualitative content of the label ‘two’.  
In any fs-imagining of mathematical symbols, the qualitative content of those symbols will 
only make it intuitive that the symbols take on certain labels if we fs-imagine those symbols as those 
labels. Fs-imagining a set of symbols as their respective labels amounts to m-imagining the content 
of those labels. For example, it is intuitive that an imagining of the symbols ‘2+2=4’ is an imagining 
of ‘two plus two equals four’ because we fs-imagine the former as the latter (i.e. in the same way that 
it is intuitive that some amalgamation of basic qualitative content is Barack Obama if we imagine it 
as such). So in order to m-imagine a proof of GC, we need to imagine a set of mathematical symbols 
and imagine them as the labels that they take on in our mathematical system.  
Even fs-imagining a certain arrangement of mathematical symbols as such does not suffice 
for m-imagining a proof of GC. It must also be the case that in virtue of recognizing the 




proof of GC. However, recognizing that an arrangement of mathematical symbols constitutes a 
proof of GC requires that we have antecedent knowledge of what arrangement of mathematical 
symbols in fact constitutes such a proof. In other words, in order for it to be intuitive to us that a set 
of symbols on a paper constitutes a proof of GC, we must have antecedent knowledge of the 
specific arrangement of symbols that in fact constitutes that proof. Given that antecedent knowledge 
of GC is required in order to authenticate our stipulation that a proof is a proof of GC, we cannot 
m-imagine GC without already knowing that GC is possible. Thus, we cannot m-imagine GC on 
Kung’s account.  
Though we cannot m-imagine GC, we have not yet been given reason to think that GC is 
impossible. However, we know that Kung argues that known a priori falsehoods and violations of 
conceptual relations are both impossible and fs-unimaginable. Since GC will be a priori impossible if 
false, once we know its modal status either it will be m-imaginable or fs-unimaginable. Thus our 
justification for classifying GC as fs-unimaginable qua being impossible depends on knowledge of 
the modal status of GC that we do not yet have. Given that we neither can m-imagine GC nor 
conclude that it is impossible, we must conclude that the modal status of GC is undecidable. Kung 
has thus met (1) without violating the conditions specified by (2).  
I.B.2: Gregory (2019):  
 According to Gregory (2019), in order for the imagination to justify a belief that GC is 
possible, we must form a mental image of GC that is reliability compatible. Forming a mental image 
of GC that is reliability-compatible thus amounts to m-imagining GC for Gregory. In order to 
determine whether a mental image is reliability compatible, we must determine whether there could 
be a possible world in which there is a subject who is having a visual appearance where things look 
like that (i.e. how they look in our mental image) where she enjoys visual reliability conditions. 




According to Gregory, the contents that can feature in our mental images are constrained by 
the contents that have featured in our previous visual experiences. Note that this is not to claim that 
we can only form mental images of certain contents arranged exactly as they have been arranged in 
our previous visual experiences. Rather, we can combine different items that have featured in the 
contents of our visual experiences in order to form mental images of things of which we have not 
actually had visual experiences.  
For example, suppose that I form a mental image of my cat wearing a pink bow tie. I have 
never had a visual experience of this (i.e. I have never seen my cat wearing a pink bow tie), but I 
have had visual experiences of both my cat and of pink bow ties. On Gregory’s view, if I can form a 
mental image in which I connect those visual appearances to the conceptual descriptions of ‘my cat’ 
and ‘pink bow ties,’ I can form the conceptual conclusion that what my visual image contains is ‘my 
cat wearing a pink bow tie.’ Since the content of my visual image depicts things of which I have 
antecedently had visual experiences, I can conclude that I have a mental image of my cat wearing a 
pink bow tie.  
Provided that I can imagine a possible world in which there is a subject who has a visual 
appearance where things look like that (i.e. like how my visual image depicts them as looking) where 
she enjoys visual reliability conditions, I am justified in concluding that it possible for my cat to wear 
a pink bow tie.24 More formally, an antecedent ‘P’ where P is ‘my visual image contains my cat and a 
pink bow tie’ combines with ‘if my visual image contains my cat and a pink bow tie, then possibly 
my cat is wearing a pink bow tie’ to yield the consequent ‘Q’ where Q is ‘possibly my cat is wearing a 
pink bow tie.’  
                                               
24 That I can in fact imagine this possible-world subject is plausible. Given that a given subject enjoys visual reliability 
conditions in case there is nothing aberrant about her visual system, she can presumably have a visual appearance of the 
cat in question under visual reliability conditions. In other words, there will be nothing about being under visual 
reliability conditions that will prevent her from having such a visual appearance. We can contrast this with cases such 
seeing odd visual appearances while hallucinating. In those cases, enjoying visual reliability conditions will be 




It may seem as though we can form a mental image of a proof of GC this same way. We 
need only to form a mental image in which we combine the mathematical symbols of which we have 
previously had visual experiences. This would yield the antecedent P where P is ‘my visual image 
contains the symbols X^1….X^N.’ Provided that I can image a possible world in which there is a 
subject to whom things look like that, I should be able combine that antecedent with ‘if my visual 
images contain symbols X^1...X^N, then possibly X^1....X^N constitute a mathematical proof’ to 
yield ‘possibly, X^1...X^N constitute a mathematical proof.’  
I argue that it’s not the case that we can form a mental image of a proof of GC in this way 
without having antecedent knowledge that GC is possible. Forming a mental image of some 
mathematical symbols X^1…X^N will not amount to forming a mental image of a proof of GC 
unless we imagine the mathematical symbols X^1…X^N that in fact constitute a proof of GC. In 
order to pick out those symbols we need to have knowledge of which mathematical symbols in fact 
constitute a proof of GC, but of course picking out the requisite mathematical symbols requires 
having antecedent knowledge of a proof of GC. Thus, forming a mental image of GC requires 
possessing the very piece of knowledge that we set out hoping to gain. Since we cannot even form a 
mental image of GC that is evaluable for reliability compatibleness, we can make no conclusions 
about either the possibility or impossibility of GC. Its modal status is thus indeterminate.  
Though Gregory (2019) does fulfill (1), he does so only because we cannot form the 
minimum mental image of GC needed to get his line of reasoning off the ground. We might think 
then that (2019) fulfills (1) not in virtue of its own good-making features but because it is 
inadequately equipped to handle the case in the first place. Since Gregory (2004) focuses solely on 
the modal status of propositional imaginings, it is plausible that (2019) is inadequate in this way 
because it is Gregory’s imagistic account that was never intended to the take up the propositional 




(1) in virtue of the work that their respective lines of reasoning accomplish, that (2019) meets (1) in 
this weaker way makes it the least compelling of the four options. If any account offers the strongest 
evaluation of GC it will insead be one of the former three and it is those accounts that I will evaluate 
in the proceeding section.  
I.C: Evaluation 
 I argue that Yablo, Kung, and Gregory (2004) each provide a successful evaluation of GC by 
arguing that we are unable to m-imagine propositions of unknown truth value if they are necessary if 
true. This move is most apparent with respect to Yablo because he claims explicitly that our ability 
to imagine a correct proof of not-GC is limited by our lack of confidence that some number is in fact 
unavailable as the sum of two primes (32). Recall that plausibly, our lack of confidence will only 
dissipate once we know that some number is in fact unavailable as the sum of two primes. If lack of 
knowledge leads to lack of confidence, then to claim that lack of confidence makes us unable to 
imagine a correct proof of GC is to commit to the claim that lack of knowledge leads to that 
imaginative inability. We are thus unable to imagine a correct proof of not-GC (or imagine a correct 
proof of GC) because it is unknown.  
However, not-GC’s unknown status likewise renders it m-unimaginable only because GC is 
necessary if true. We can m-imagine both contingent propositions and their negations even if they are 
unknown. For example, I do not know whether Barack Obama in fact has a home library. Even so, I 
can m-imagine a world of which it is veridical that Barack Obama has a home library and I can m-
imagine a world of which it is veridical that Barack Obama does not have a home library. In 
contrast, given that GC is necessary if true, its negation is impossible if false and vice versa. Since we 
cannot m-imagine impossibilities, we will be equally unable to m-imagine GC as not-GC. Since we 




what is m-imaginable or m-unimaginable. GC thus comes out as modally undecidable because it is 
necessary if true.  
 Kung seems to endorse the claim that propositions of unknown truth value that are 
necessary if true will be m-unimaginable. According to Kung, we will only be able to authenticate 
our fs-imagining of GC if we find it intuitive that in our imagining, GC. We find it intuitive that GC 
if in virtue of recognizing a given arrangement of mathematical symbols as their labels, we recognize 
that the arrangement constitutes a proof of GC. Recall though that recognizing that an arrangement 
of mathematical symbols constitutes a proof of GC requires that we have antecedent knowledge of 
what arrangement of mathematical symbols in fact constitutes such a proof. As a result, we can find 
it intuitive that GC and thus authenticate our imagining of GC only if we have knowledge of GC. 
Since we of course do not have knowledge of GC, we will be unable to authenticate our imagining 
of GC. This line of reasoning likewise applies when we try to imagine a proof of not-GC.  
 Again, it is GC’s necessity if true that allows its unknown status to render it m-unimaginable 
on Kung’s account. We can m-imagine both contingent propositions and their negations even if 
their truth values are unknown. For example, I can find it intuitive in an imagining that Barack 
Obama has a home library (provided that I authenticate my assignments) and I can likewise find it 
intuitive that Barack Obama does not have a home library. Thus, we can neither find it intuitive that 
GC nor find it intuitive that not-GC because GC is necessary if true. In other words, GC’s necessity 
if true makes it modally undecidable.  
That Gregory makes the same move as Yablo and Kung is less apparent only because he 
explicates his line of reasoning in less detail than do the two of them. On Gregory’s account, we 
need a convincing demonstration for GC in order to render not-GC not unshakeably imaginable (or 
vice versa). Since GC is necessary if true, concluding that not-GC is not unshakeably imaginable and 




therefore necessary. However, we will not be able to have a convincing demonstration of not-GC 
without having knowledge of a proof of not-GC and vice versa for GC. Thus, we will be unable to 
conclude anything about the modal status of GC unless a proof of not-GC is known (and vice 
versa). Gregory is able to classify GC as modally undecidable because we lack a convincing 
demonstration of either GC or not-GC, but we lack a convincing demonstration of either because 
GC is unknown.   
 We need a convincing demonstration of not-GC (or of GC) in the first place because GC is 
a priori necessary if true and impossible if false. If GC were contingent, we would have no reason to 
think that there would be a convincing demonstration of GC (or of not-GC). Rather, we would 
instead try to establish GC’s modal status by trying to imagine it under certain accessible, non-modal 
suppositions. However, we have already seen that suppositions render certain propositions fs-
unimaginable only if those suppositions ensure that subsequent conceptual entailment relations 
obtain. Recognizing those conceptual entailment relations renders the propositions in question fs-
unimaginable because they demonstrate that there is no possible world in which those propositions 
can obtain. If a conceptual entailment relation demonstrates that there is no possible world in which 
a proposition X can obtain, we have reason to think that X is impossible.  
However, we have supposed that GC is contingent. So, we know that no conceptual 
entailment relation will demonstrate that there is no possible world in which GC can obtain. Thus, if 
GC were contingent, we would have reason to think that there will be no supposition under which 
GC will be fs-unimaginable. We could instead include that, since no supposition will shake its 
imaginability (FS), GC is m-imaginable if contingent. Thus, it is that GC is necessary if true that 
renders it modally undecidable on Gregory’s account.  




m-unimaginability of propositions of unknown truth value that are necessary if true makes the 
success of each hinge on an error theoretic move. Since we can imagine unknown necessary if true 
propositions in senses that are not modally salient, we need to be discerning in order to distinguish 
the modally salient sense from the others. Plausibly, we will not always be so discerning and thus err 
in thinking that we have imagined GC in the modally salient way when in fact we cannot imagine 
GC in that way. Since Yablo and Gregory both have error theoretic views, it is unsurprising that they 
make this kind of error theoretic maneuver. In contrast, Kung otherwise purports to rely on there 
being something about the imagistic content of our imaginings that justifies our modal beliefs.  
I argue that even though Kung fulfills (1), it is this error theoretic move and not the imagistic 
nature of his account that allows for his success. First, recall that Kung picks out no modally salient 
sense of imagining as imagistically distinct from the others. Rather, our imaginings are probative in 
case all of the assignments in them have been authenticated.25 Recall that assignments in our 
imaginings are authenticated in case we find it intuitive that the depicted imagined content of our 
imaginings could take on the labels and stipulations we have predicated of it. One way that we will 
find it X intuitive in an imagining is if X corresponds to an actual world X. Alternatively, we can find 
X intuitive in an imagining if we imagine the origin of X where it is intuitive that it is X that is 
coming to be (i.e. recall the authentication of <GenaesSecondCat> where we imagined me bringing 
the cat home from the shelter). In this latter case, the imaginings of me obtaining the cat can be 
authenticated by appealing to actual world facts about shelters and cats, and I can authenticate my 
original imagining by appealing to these recursive imaginings. 
 What is doing the work in justifying our inferences from imaginability to possibility is thus 
not the imagistic nature of our imaginings but rather the authentication work that occurs with 
respect to the assignments that we predicate of our mental images. Recall that it is our failure to 
                                               




authenticate, not our failure to imagistically imagine, that prevents us from m-imagining GC. 
Further, given that we can explain any mistaken attributions of possibility to our images by pointing 
to errors in our authentication efforts (e.g. taking it to be intuitive that X when we are in fact still 
stipulating that X and it is in fact only intuitive that X1), the line of reasoning on which we 
authenticate our assignments is itself error theoretic.  
Kung’s account thus does not meet (1) in virtue of its imagistic nature. While the account 
relies on an error theoretic move that is not explicitly specified as such, this alone does not give us 
reason to prefer the two error theoretic accounts. Rather, it simply reveals that even accounts that 
do not take a strictly error theoretic approach require such an error theoretic move in order to 
classify GC as modally undecidable. If this is the case, then error theoretic lines of reasoning are 
needed for fruitful evaluations of test cases like GC.  
Section II: Image of an Apparent Impossibility 
In this section, I argue that error theoretic accounts are similarly best equipped to guide us 
towards modal knowledge with respect to images that depict impossibilities. I do so by using one of 
the images below as case study. I explicate how each of the four accounts might evaluate the image. 
I proceed to argue that though all of the accounts provide successful evaluations of it, it turns out 
that they all rely on the same error theoretic move in order to do so. I conclude by arguing that 





Prior to beginning, it is again necessary to get clear on what the burden of proof is. Recall 
that it was critical in the previous case that no account took a firm stance with respect to the modal 
status of GC. In contrast, I argue that each account ought to conclude that the images below depict 
impossibilities.  
 
In this section, I explicate how each of the four accounts might evaluate Figure 1. However, 
given that all three of the figures above depict impossibilities, the evaluations that follow will 
likewise apply to Figures 2-3. Further, I take all of the claims that I make below with respect to 
Figure 1 to apply to Figures 2-3. Thus, in order to deny any of the proceeding conclusions with 
respect to Figure 1, you must also deny those conclusions with respect to Figures 2-3.  
Figure 1 is a modified version of an Escher Staircase and depicts a set of stairs that appear to 
be ascending only to end up at a point lower than the point at which they begin. Given that I ascend 
from X to Y if and only if Y is spatially above X, I cannot ascend from X to Y if Y is a point lower 
than where I began. So, if the stairs depicted in the image end up at a lower point than the point at 
which they begin, it’s not the case that the stairs ascend. However, the image depicts a scene in 
which it appears as though a set of stairs does in fact ascend from one end to the other. The image 




thus depicts an impossibility. As a result, any account must accomplish the following in order to 
offer a successful evaluation of it: 
1) It must classify Figure 1 as impossible; and 
2) It must accomplish (1) without relying on antecedent modal knowledge about propositions 
whose truth value we come to know a posteriori.26 
 
II.A: Error Theoretic Solutions 
II.A.1: Gregory (2004):  
While Gregory (2004) does not explicitly take up cases of impossible objects, that omission 
does not prevent him from being able to evaluate this case. When we assess the modal status of 
Figure 1, we are concerned with whether a staircase can ascend only to end up at a point lower than 
the point at which it begins. We can thus evaluate the modal status of the proposition that ‘there is 
some X that ascends only to end up at a point lower than the point at which it begins.’ Whether that 
proposition is possible will determine whether it is possible for a staircase to take on the property 
predicated by it. Error theoretic accounts like Gregory’s can thus evaluate the modal status of 
imagined objects by evaluating whether those objects can take on the properties predicated of them 
by certain propositions.  
Given that we have antecedent a priori reason to believe that the proposition above is 
impossible, we ought to find that proposition m-unimaginable. However, the proposition is not an 
obvious a priori impossibility like ‘that there is a married bachelor.’ Rather, that ‘some X ascends only 
to end up at a point lower than the point at which it begins’ is more like the less obvious 
impossibility that ‘there is barber who shaves all and only those barbers who are not self-shavers.’   
Even though the proposition above is not obviously impossible, we still find less obvious a 
priori impossibilities m-unimaginable once we recognize that there are convincing demonstrations of 
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their negations. Recall that a convincing demonstration of X amounts to an argument that X where 
we could never imagine either that one of the argument’s premises fails or that one of its inferences 
leads from truth to falsity (337). We have good reason to believe that there will be a convincing 
demonstration by reductio for ‘it’s not the case that some X ascends only to end up at a point lower 
than the point at which it begins’ like the following:  
 Suppose that there is some X that ascends only to end up at a point lower than the point at 
which it begins. If X ascends to Y, then Y is spatially above X. But X ends up at a point Y that is 
lower than the point at which it begins. So, if X ascends to Y but Y is a point lower than the point at 
which X begins then X both ascends and does not ascend.  
 
 On Gregory’s account, if we suppose that the convincing demonstration above for exists, we 
will find ‘some X ascends only to end up at a point lower than the point at which it begins’ fs-
unimaginable under that supposition. As a result, we will not be able to m-imagine that latter 
impossible proposition. If that proposition is m-unimaginable, then it is likewise m-unimaginable 
that an object can in fact possess the property that the proposition would predicate of it. Gregory 
has thus met (1) without violating (2) and fulfilled all of the conditions necessary for a successful 
evaluation of Figure 1.  
II.A.2: Yablo (1993) 
Yablo (1993) offers an error theoretic solution to Figure 1 that, like his solution to the GC 
case, relies upon possible worlds. He first makes a distinction between objectual and propositional 
imaginings. Objectual imaginings have referential content, which is the type of content that depicts 
an object (27). In contrast, propositional imaginings have alethic content, which is the type of 
content that can be evaluated for truth or falsity. Objectual imaginings are often accompanied by 
propositional imaginings, because we often fs-imagine that certain objects have certain properties. 
For example, suppose that I imagine a tiger. In doing so, I might imagine that the tiger has unusually 




or falsity, we can evaluate whether it is veridical in a scenario that a given object has a certain 
property.  
We can thus use Yablo’s method in order to evaluate whether objectual imaginings can in 
fact take on the characteristics that their propositional accompaniments predicate of them. Recall 
that we are justified in concluding that P is possible in case we can fs-imagine a world of which P is 
veridical.27 For example, suppose that I form a mental image of a tiger that has unusually long limbs. 
I am justified in concluding that a tiger could have unusually long limbs so long as I can fs-imagine a 
world of which it is veridical that a tiger has unusually long limbs. I take it to be plausible that we are 
capable of such an imagining. We need only fs-imagine a world in which conditions allow a tiger to 
be born with unusually long limbs.28 We are thus justified in concluding that it is possible that a tiger 
could have unusually long limbs.  
We can apply the same method in order to evaluate Figure 1. First, form a mental image of 
it. Since Figure 1 appears to depict a set of stairs that ascend only to end up at a point lower than the 
point at which they began their ascent, predicate of the figure that it does this. You thus have an 
objectual imagining of Figure 1 that is accompanied by the propositional imagining that the set of 
stairs ascends only to end up at a lower point than the point at which it begins. You can then 
evaluate whether Figure 1 could in fact take on the property predicated of it by that proposition by 
attempting to imagine a world in which that proposition is veridical of the object. In other words, 
you can attempt to imagine a world of which it is veridical that there is a set of stairs that ascends 
only to end up at a lower point than the point at which it begins.  
We might think that Yablo would argue that you will not be able to m-imagine this. 
Previously, Yablo argued that it is m-unimaginable to him that addition facts vary between worlds. 
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On his view, addition facts are a priori necessary. If what we take to be a mathematical truth turns 
out to be false in a given world, we ought to conclude that the world in question assigns different 
meanings to the mathematical symbols rather than conclude that our mathematical facts are false.  
We might think that Yablo would mount the same defense against our being able to m-
imagine the staircase in question. Given that the staircase ascends only to end up at a lower point 
than the point at which it begins and X ascends to Y if and only if Y is spatially above X, we can say 
that the staircase both ascends and does not ascend. It thus violates the law of non-contradiction.  
However, we might think that the law of non-contradiction is a priori necessary.29 If so, then 
a world in which the law of non-contradiction is false would be m-unimaginable. Should there be a 
world in which there is a staircase that appears to both ascend and not-ascend, it would not be a 
world where the staircase is in fact ascending and not-ascending and to ascend and not-ascend mean 
what we take them to mean. Just as in the GC case, Yablo could appeal to the unimaginability of 
impossibilities in order to conclude that we cannot m-imagine that Figure 1 has the property 
predicated of it (i.e. being ascending and not-ascending).  
Note that this is not to commit Yablo to the claim that Figure 1 is unimaginable in every 
sense of ‘imagine.’ It is not a question of whether we will be able to form a mental image of Figure 
1. What is in question is whether we can fs-imagine that the proposition that predicates ascension 
and non-ascension of it is true.  
                                               
29 The status of the law of contradiction is controversial. It is up for debate both whether the law is necessary and 
whether it is a priori and thus a fortiori up for debate whether it is both necessary and a priori. Dialetheists even deny that 
the law is true (Priest 1998).  
 
An evaluation of the status of the law of non-contradiction is outside the scope of this thesis. However, given that the 
dialetheist view is a minority one and that dialetheists would arguably take the law to hold in the kinds of cases presented 
here, I take us to be justified in accepting the law of non-contradiction as true. For our purposes, I also take it to be 
plausible that the law is both necessary and a priori. Suppose that it turns out that the law of non-contradiction is not 
necessary. Given that contradictions entail any proposition, a possible world in which the law of contradiction is false 
would be a possible world in which anything goes. This would cause us to have to restructure the overarching project at 
hand because we would then have reason to think that what we thought were impossibilities might in fact be possible. 
Determining what such a restructured project might look like is likewise outside the scope of the thesis, and as such I 




Though we have reason to think that the Figure 1 is not m-imaginable, that reason does not 
suffice to justify our belief that Figure 1 is impossible. We need to provide positive evidence that 
Figure 1 is m-unimaginable. Absent such positive evidence, we have no more reason to think that 
Figure 1 is impossible than to think that its modal status is undecidable, as it would be if we found 
that Figure 1 is not only m-unimaginable but also not m-imaginable.  
Recall that according to Yablo, P is m-unimaginable in case I cannot fs-imagine a world that 
I do not take to falsify P (29). In order to m-imagine a world that I do not take to falsify P, where P 
is the proposition that predicates of the staircase that it both ascends and does not-ascend, I have to 
m-imagine a world of which the law of non-contradiction is false. However, if we think that Yablo 
would conclude that we cannot m-imagine that the law of non-contradiction varies between worlds, 
then we can infer that he would conclude that we will likewise be unable to m-imagine a world of 
which the law of non-contradiction is false. As a result, we are plausibly justified in concluding that it 
is m-unimaginable that there is a staircase that both ascends and does not ascend. Given that it is m-
unimaginable that there is such a staircase, we are justified in concluding that Figure 1 (which depicts 
such a staircase) depicts an impossibility.  
II.B: Imagistic Solutions:  
II.B.1: Kung (2010) 
Whether Kung’s (2010) imagistic account can block an ascription of possibility to an 
imagining of Figure 1 depends in what kind of content we take an imagining of it to consist. If we 
think that an imagining of Figure 1 contains only basic qualitative content, then Kung must classify 
it as probative. If this is the case, then he immediately fails to meet (1). In contrast, if we think that 
an imagining of the figure contains both basic qualitative and assigned content, then Kung meets (1). 




and more generally on what type of content we take to count as assigned instead of as basic 
qualitative.  
 First, it is plausible that an imagining of Figure 1 contains only basic qualitative content. 
Recall that basic qualitative content includes basic shapes, lines, and spatial properties. Arguably, 
Figure 1 contains no more than simple shapes, lines, and the spatial relations between them. Second, 
we might think that it is plausible that we will be able to form a mental image of the figure in its 
entirety. This contrasts with the chiliagon case, where we lack the capacity to imagistically imagine 
the chiliagon in its entirety and instead are only able to form a mental image of an additional side 
being inserted in between two other sides.  
If we find those two claims plausible, then we can categorize our imagining of Figure 1 as 
probative. Remember that according to Kung, we are immediately prima facie justified in taking 
imaginings that solely contain basic qualitative content to be probative. For example, when I imagine 
a blue surface in front of me, I am immediately prima facie justified in thinking that there could be 
such a surface in front of me. However, if our mental image of Figure 1 also only contains basic 
qualitative content, then we are also immediately prima facie justified in taking that imagining to be 
probative.  
Since he allows basic qualitative content to be probative without qualification, Kung cannot 
argue that our imagining of Figure 1 fails to be probative in virtue of failing to meet additional 
justificatory conditions. Either he must say that an imagining of it has assigned content and that the 
assigned content cannot be authenticated, or he must concede that we cannot be immediately 
justified in taking just any imagining that solely contains basic qualitative content to be probative. 
Given that it is plausible that an imagining of Figure 1 does in fact only contain basic qualitative 




 Alternatively, we might think that there are at least some (even if minimal) assignments in 
Figure 1. At first glance, it may appear that we can authenticate those assignments and so we might 
think that Kung’s account again fails to meet (1). However, even if we authenticate our assignments, 
our imagining will fail to be probative in virtue of a further condition that Kung introduces. I will 
explicate how we might try to authenticate our assignments and proceed to explain how even our 
authenticated imagining will not be probative given Kung’s additional condition.  
We can try to authenticate our assignments in Figure 1 via the same method that Kung uses 
to authenticate his imagining of the chiliagon. First, suppose that just as we stipulated the n-sided 
figure, we must stipulate the stairs in Figure 1 as <stairs> and stipulate that the various lines and 
shaded sections are oriented the way that they are. Making these stipulations is not disqualifying, 
because they can be authenticated via the same method by which we authenticated the n-sided 
figure. As before, we begin with a shape or line that we do not need to stipulate. In this case, 
suppose that we begin with the farthest left line of the stairs. We then fs-imagine attaching an 
additional line to that original line, thereby forming the far left stairstep. We continue this process of 
attaching lines until we have a mental image of the entirety of the figure. As in the chiliagon case, 
that both our original line was not stipulated and that our imagining of each line insertion is 
qualitative makes it such that we do not arrive at our imagining of the final image via stipulation. 
Given that we have authenticated our imagining of Figure 1, it seems like we are justified in taking 
that imagining to be probative. 
 However, an ascription of possibility to our imagining will instead be blocked by the last 
condition of MEI.30 That condition states that there must be no R such that our imagining makes it 
intuitive that both R and not-R (657). Since the stairs in our imagining appear to both ascend and 
not-ascend, our imagining violates that condition. The last condition of MEI thus prevents our 
                                               




imagining from being probative even if we have authenticated our assignments, and Kung’s account 
succeeds in meeting (1).  
Though Kung offers a successful evaluation of Figure 1, we might wonder why we ought to 
endorse the last condition of MEI that facilitates it. Kung explicitly states the condition as:  
“There is no R such that either (a) R follows from ‘the assignments alone’ yet it is intuitive 
that not-R; or (b) it is intuitive that R and intuitive that not-R (654).”  
 
 However, all of the cases to which Kung applies the condition when introducing it are 
examples of (a). We are first presented with a case in which Justin Timberlake imagines a square-like 
figure and stipulates that it is round (654). The condition above blocks Timberlake’s imagining from 
being probative because that the figure is round follows from assignments alone given that it is 
intuitive to him that the figure is a square. Timberlake’s imagining is thus a case of (a).  
Kung then provides a more complicated case where we are to imagine that Thomas Nagel is 
a fried egg. The condition above will also block this case from being probative because that the eggy 
thing is Thomas Nagel will follow from assignments alone even though it is intuitive that the 
imagined object is in fact not Thomas Nagel (655). It becomes clear that will have to follow from 
stipulation alone that the eggy thing is Thomas Nagel when we attempt to authenticate that 
stipulation. One way to attempt to do this would be to imagine Thomas Nagel coming to be a fried 
egg (e.g. imagining a bird laying an egg that contains Thomas Nagel). However, the only way in 
which the egg like substance will be Thomas Nagel is if we stipulate it as such and thus recursive 
imaginings fail to authenticate our stipulation. Kung concludes from this that even if we might 
initially think that it is in fact intuitive that an imagined fried egg is Thomas Nagel, attempting to 
imagine scenarios like Thomas Nagel coming to be as a fried egg reveals that what we thought were 
intuitions were actually stipulations, and that what is intuitive is just that the fried egg is simply a 




That neither of these cases are examples of (b) gives us reason to wonder what exactly Kung 
has in mind as a case of (b). It might be that mental images of things like Escher Staircases count as 
those kinds of cases, but even if so we have not been given reason to think that cases like these 
ought to count as non-probative. With respect to (a) cases, Kung has antecedently shown us why we 
should not classify things that are merely stipulated as probative. As a result, when we find that X 
follows from stipulation alone and find it intuitive that not-X, we have reason to think that our 
imagining is not a probative imagining of X.  
We might think that we can instead supplement reason to block ascriptions of possibility to 
(b) cases by appealing to the kind of defense that we took Yablo to offer us. On a Yablo-esque line 
of reasoning, fs-imaginings that depict contradictions cannot be probative (i.e. m-imaginings) 
because the law of non-contradiction is necessary. Fs-imaginings that depict contradictions thus 
cannot be probative because anything that violates the law of non-contradiction will be impossible.  
Suppose that we grant Kung that kind of Yablo-esque defense for the last condition of MEI. 
Even so, that we need that condition to sort our imagining of the Escher Staircase into the 
impossible camp reveals that our imagining fails to count as probative not because its depicted 
content lacks possibility-making features. The depicted content is either probative without 
qualification (if it consists in basic qualitative content) or authenticatable (if it consists in mixed 
imagined content). What allows Kung to sort our imagining of the Escher Staircase into the right 
place is rather a condition that appeals to modal facts about the law of non-contradiction. Further, 
relying upon such a condition is itself error theoretic. Our imaginings are not probative if they fail to 
meet certain conditions and we can err in thinking that X is probative when in fact those conditions 
make it such that we cannot imagine X probatively.  
Recall that in the GC case, I argued that the fact that Kung’s success turns on an error 




in favor of an explicitly error theoretic one. However in that case, the key error theoretic move itself 
was one for which Kung provides support. We were given reason to think that our mental image of 
GC was non-authenticatable on the grounds that we could not find it intuitive that the image was an 
image of GC unless we had antecedent knowledge of GC. In contrast, the key move in this case is a 
condition that Kung introduces with no defense. We have no reason to think that imaginings that 
depict contradictions ought not to be probative unless we supply our own Yablo-esque line of 
reasoning. Unlike in the GC case, we are supplying support for an error theoretic move in addition 
to merely classifying it as such.  
I claim that Kung’s neglect to provide reason to endorse the last condition to MEI does 
suffice to prefer the two error theoretic accounts canvassed above. Further, even if we reject a 
preference for Gregory (2004) and Yablo on these grounds, we must remember that Kung only 
meets (1) so long as we accept that our imagining of the Escher Staircase has assigned content. So 
even if we do not think that Kung’s appeal to the necessity of the law of non-contradiction is ad hoc, 
his ability to meet (1) still depends on a charitable interpretive move. Since the two previous error 
theoretic accounts meet (1) via methods that both are not so ad hoc and do not rely on interpretive 
ambiguities, we have reason to prefer them instead.  
II.B.2: Gregory (2019) 
Whether we can ascribe possibility to a mental image on Gregory’s (2019) imagistic account 
depends upon whether the depicted content of that image has the requisite good-making features. 
According to Gregory, we are prima facie justified in concluding that what our mental images display 
is possible if we have reason to think that what those mental images display is reliability compatible. 
We have reason to think that what our mental images display is reliability compatible if we can fs-




that (i.e. like how our image displays them to look) where that subject enjoys visual reliability 
conditions.  
However, it is not clear what would count as having a visual appearance of something like 
the Escher Staircase. Earlier I claimed that plausibly, one such visual appearance might be of a 
sculptural representation of the Staircase. However, it is unclear whether Gregory would grant that 
this is a visual appearance of an Escher Staircase rather than something that is merely very Escher 
Staircase-like. This uncertainty is bad for Gregory because whether this case gets off the ground on 
his account depends upon whether we can imagine a subject having a visual appearance of an Escher 
Staircase under visual reliability conditions. If it turns out that a mental image of a sculptural 
representation does not count as a mental image of an Escher Staircase and we can in fact form no 
such mental image, then the case becomes unevaluable on Gregory’s (2019) account.  
Let us grant for now that the sculptural representation does count as a visual appearance of 
an Escher Staircase and that we can fs-imagine a possible world in which there is a subject who has 
that visual appearance under visual reliability conditions. We are thus justified in concluding that our 
mental image of the staircase is reliability compatible. Though meeting this condition allows us to be 
prima facie justified in concluding that Escher Staircases are possible, our prima facie justification will 
only convert to straightforward justification if we have reason to think that there are no defeating 
considerations around.   
In this case, our prima facie justification will be blocked from converting to straightforward 
justification because “our knowledge of the nature of space tells us straightaway that the scenarios 
shown by [the Escher Staircase] cannot be realized (10).” Here our knowledge of the nature of space 
serves as a defeating consideration. Given that straightforward justification is required to ascribe 
possibility and that defeating consideration blocks us from attaining straightforward justification, we 




 Whether this justificatory block succeeds in meeting (1) without violating (2) depends upon 
what kind of knowledge we take knowledge of the nature of space to be. On the one hand, we might 
think of knowledge of the nature of space as a posteriori knowledge. Plausibly, there are facts about 
the nature of space whose recognition requires our observing space itself. If this is the case, then 
appealing to knowledge of the nature of space in order block our justificatory conversion makes it 
such that Gregory would violate (2).  
 Alternatively, we might think that the way that space can be arranged is confined by what is 
logically possible. Knowledge of the nature of space (i.e. what can be realized in space) would then 
reduce to knowledge of logical possibilities. Given that we obtain knowledge of logical possibilities a 
priori, Gregory’s account would no longer violate (2) on this interpretation.   
 If we grant that knowledge of the nature of space reduces to knowledge of logical 
possibilities and Figure 1 depicts a contradiction, then saying that “the scenarios shown by the image 
above cannot be realized,” is to say that contradictions cannot be realized. However, this is just to 
make the same move that Yablo made earlier. The claim that contradictions cannot be realized 
entails the claim that non-contradiction is necessary. Thus by blocking our justificatory move on the 
grounds that the Escher scenario cannot be realized, Gregory implicitly commits himself to the 
claim that the law of non-contradiction is necessary and anything that depicts a contradiction is 
therefore impossible.  
 Just as with the Kung and the GC case, that Gregory makes this Yablo-esque move without 
explicitly saying that he does so will not disqualify him given that the move itself is legitimate per (2). 
However, recall that his account meets (1) in the first place only because we made the interpretive 
assumption that we can in fact have a visual appearance of an Escher Staircase. If our assumption is 




Yablo meet (1) without us needing to make questionable interpretive moves on the part of their 
accounts in order for them to do so. I take this to put those two accounts on sturdier footing.  
II.C: Evaluation 
 In this section, I argue that Gregory (2004) and Yablo provide the most compelling 
evaluations of the Escher case in virtue of providing the strongest defenses of the error theoretic 
move on which all four accounts hinge. First, the previous sections reveal that all four accounts 
provide successful evaluations of GC only by assuming that the law of non-contradiction is 
necessary. However, we saw that the two imagistic accounts leave this move either under defended 
or potentially unutilized. Kung sets up a line of reasoning in order to authenticate the assignments in 
our mental images, but that line of reasoning does not suffice to block mental images of the Escher 
Staircase from counting as probative. He instead arrives at a successful evaluation of the case via a 
seemingly ad hoc condition. While we could defend that condition via justifying an assumption about 
the necessity of the law of non-contradiction and the subsequent impossibility of its negation, Kung 
leaves the condition undefended.  
It initially appeared that Gregory (2019) could defeat our ascription of possibility to Figure 1 
via a condition that likewise assumes the necessity of the law of non-contradiction. While we were 
prima facie justified in ascribing possibility to an imagining of Figure 1, his condition blocked our 
prima facie justification from converting to straightforward justification. However, his account 
requires that we fs-imagine a subject having a visual appearance of Figure 1 in order to get off the 
ground. Given that it is unclear whether we can have in fact a visual appearance of an Escher Staircase 
(i.e. instead of something that is merely Escher Staircase-like), it is uncertain whether the case is 
evaluable on his line of reasoning. Gregory’s condition thus cannot do much for us if it is not clear 





Unlike the two imagistic accounts, Gregory’s (2004) assumption about the necessity of the 
law of non-contradiction is defensible on his line of reasoning. On Gregory’s view impossibilities 
(both a priori and a posteriori) are not m-imaginable (i.e. not unshakeably imaginable) (335). However, 
we will not always recognize a given impossibility as such and ‘there is a staircase that ascends only 
to end up at a point lower than the point at which it begins’ is one such less obvious a priori 
impossibility. Further, we might take ourselves to be able to m-imagine impossible propositions 
prior to recognizing them as impossible. For example, someone who does not know that it is 
impossible for there to be a barber who shaves all and only those barbers who are not self-shavers 
may take herself to be able to m-imagine that there is such a barber (335). However, once we 
recognize that proposition as an impossibility, we will find it m-unimaginable.   
Recognizing convincing demonstrations helps us recognize less obvious a priori 
impossibilities as such. When we recognize that there is a convincing demonstration for a given a 
priori necessity, we recognize the negation of that a priori necessity as impossible. We will thus find it 
fs-unimaginable ‘that there is a staircase that ascends only to end up at a point lower than the point 
at which it begins’ under the supposition that there exists a convincing demonstration for its 
negation because making that supposition reveals that its negation is a priori necessary. Thus, when 
Gregory assumes that there will be a convincing demonstration for the law of non-contradiction 
under which the proposition above will be fs-unimaginable, he assumes that the law is a priori 
necessary. As a result, it is assuming the necessity of the law of non-contradiction that renders ‘there 
is a staircase that ascends only to end up at a point lower than the point at which it begins’ m-
unimaginable because a priori impossibilities are m-unimaginable. Given that we already have reason 
to think that a priori impossibilities are m-unimaginable, the appeal is defensible. 
Yablo’s assumption about the necessity of the law of non-contradiction is likewise defensible 




ascends and does not ascend’ is impossible if we cannot m-imagine a world in which ‘it’s not the 
case that a staircase both ascends and does not ascend’ is false. Whether we can m-imagine such a 
world depends upon whether we can m-imagine that the law of non-contradiction varies between 
worlds. If we take the law to be necessary, then it will be m-unimaginable that it is false in a given 
possible world. As a result, we will not be able to m-imagine a world in which ‘it’s not the case that a 
staircase both ascends and does not ascend’ is false and we are justified in taking ‘a staircase both 
ascends and does not ascend’ to be impossible.  
 Yablo thus also endorses the assumption that if a proposition is necessary, worlds in which 
that proposition is false will be m-unimaginable. Yablo’s appeal to the necessity of the law of non-
contradiction renders the Escher case m-unimaginable because a priori impossibilities are m-
unimaginable. Since we have reason to think that a priori impossibilities are m-unimaginable, Yablo’s 
appeal is defensible.  
Earlier, I argued that relying upon a priori modal knowledge is legitimate. Looking at the 
respective accounts also shows that appealing to antecedent a priori knowledge can be a bad-making 
feature if an account makes the appeal without providing reason for doing so. Given that both 
appealing to a priori knowledge and supporting such an appeal do not require us to consult the 
imagistic content of our imaginings, image-based accounts are not going to be the strongest modal 












In this thesis I have argued that error theoretic accounts give us stronger reason to think that 
the imagination will guide us towards knowledge of possibilities than do their imagistic counterparts. 
I first took up two error theoretic accounts and showed that each account is epistemically circular 
and in need of revision. I then argued that after revision, both accounts provide tenable error 
theoretic reason to think that the imagination will guide us towards knowledge of possibilities. I then 
canvassed two imagistic accounts that, unlike error theoretic accounts, take there to be something 
about the imagistic content of our imaginings that makes them suitable guides to knowledge of 
possibilities.  
After making clear how both types of accounts are supposed to work, I evaluated how each 
of the accounts fared when confronted with what I categorized as test cases. While each of the 
accounts provides successful evaluations of the test cases, it turns out that they all rely on an error 
theoretic move in order to do so. The error theoretic accounts predictably offer the strongest 
defense of that move. Since the test cases probe how the imagination fares as a modal 
epistemological tool, we have reason to think that error theoretic accounts of the imagination are 
best equipped to guide us towards knowledge of possibilities. 
Some of the difficulties for the imagistic accounts arise because they require that we have a 
mental image of X in order to evaluate X but do not say much about what counts as a mental image 
of X. For example, whether I can evaluate the Escher Staircase on Gregory’s (2019) account 
depends upon whether an image of a sculptural representation of the staircase to count as a mental 
image of it. As we have seen, it is not clear that the mental image in question would in fact count as 
an image of the Escher Staircase on his account.  
It is likewise unclear whether that image counts as a mental image of the staircase for Kung. 




actuality) it is unclear whether my authenticated mental image will count as a mental image of an 
Escher Staircase. Given that whether I can form a mental image of X determines whether I can 
evaluate X on both imagistic accounts, uncertainty about what makes an image of X an image of X 
weakens their respective lines of reasoning.  
Further, both imagistic accounts must take sides with respect to various controversial issues 
in the philosophy of perception because they rely heavily on parallels between imagination and 
perception. For example, Kung assumes that some labels are depicted in our imagistic imaginings 
but this requires him to assume that labels are likewise depicted in the contents of our visual 
experiences. That assumption is controversial within the philosophy of perception.  
Recall that we saw in Chapter 3 that both imagistic accounts ultimately make the correct cut 
between probative and non-probative imaginings by making an error theoretic move. Therefore, 
drawing on an analogy between the visual content of our perceptual experiences and the mental 
imagery of our imaginings does not end up doing much work for the imagistic accounts. Relying on 
the analogy with perception necessitates both imagistic accounts to take sides on controversial issues 
(e.g. what counts as basic qualitative versus assigned content, whether assignments are depicted), 
without reaping much benefit from that analogy.  
While I conclude that the error theoretic accounts offer the most compelling reason to 
endorse the imagination as a modal epistemological tool, we might think that the fact that they fail 
to be epistemically non-circular absent Ichikawa and Jarvis’ supplement suffices to block this 
conclusion. Instead, it may seem that we ought to prefer imagistic accounts that, while less 
compelling, are at least epistemically non-circular in and of themselves.  
I argue, contra this objection, that if we reject the error theoretic accounts on the basis of 
that revisionary move then we must reject all four of the accounts I have canvassed. We have seen 




theoretic move as Gregory and Yablo. Thus, in order to defend that move the imagistic accounts 
too will need to rely on an error theoretic line of reasoning similar to theirs. To argue that we cannot 
endorse that line of reasoning would thus be to reject the line of reasoning on which all of the 
accounts will ultimately rest. It is therefore not the case that we can both reject the error theoretic 
accounts on the epistemic circularity charge and simultaneously endorse the imagistic accounts.  
 However, we can question the assumptions that Gregory and Yablo must make in order to 
successfully evaluate the test cases. First, recall that in order to evaluate an image that depicts an 
impossibility on their accounts, we evaluate whether the objects that image depicts can in fact take 
on the properties predicated of them by certain propositions. We draw conclusions about the modal 
status of the propositions in question and apply those conclusions to the objects of which the 
properties specified by those propositions are predicated. For example, in the Escher Staircase 
example we found it m-unimaginable that there is a staircase that both ascends and does not ascend. 
We concluded from the m-unimaginablity of that proposition that objects of which the properties 
specified by those proposition are predicated will also be m-unimaginable.  
Gregory and Yablo thus must assume that we can make a slide from conclusions about 
imagined propositions to conclusions about imagined objects in order for their lines of reasoning to 
accommodate the latter. However, we might wonder whether an evaluation of the modal status of 
an object in fact amounts to nothing more than an evaluation of the modal status of the propositions 
that predicate properties of it. In the Escher Staircase example, it does seem plausible that if ‘there is 
a staircase that both ascends and does not ascend’ is impossible, then no possible object can in fact 
possess those properties. Even so, if we think that the slide from conclusions about propositions to 
conclusions about objects works in the Escher case, we then might wonder both whether we are 
justified in thinking that such a slide will obtain in other cases and if so, where that justification is 




 Second, recall that in order to meet the burden of proof for both test cases, Gregory and 
Yablo must rely on antecedent knowledge of a priori necessities. They rely on the fact that GC is 
necessary if true in order to evaluate it and they rel on the necessity of the law of non-contradiction 
in order to evaluate the Escher Staircase. Recall that the fact that GC is necessary if true allows them 
to classify both GC and not-GC as modally undecidable. If GC were contingent, then its unknown 
truth value would not prevent us from being able to either m-imagine GC or m-imagine not-GC. We 
can m-imagine either that a given contingent proposition obtains or that it fails to obtain without 
knowing the actual truth value of that contingent proposition.31  
In contrast, given that GC is necessary if true, its negation is impossible if false and vice 
versa. Since we cannot m-imagine impossibilities, we will either be unable to m-imagine GC or we 
will be unable to m-imagine not-GC. Since we do not know which of the two propositions is in fact 
impossible, we can make no conclusions about what is m-imaginable or m-unimaginable. That GC is 
necessary if true thus allows it to come out modally undecidable.  
In the second case, we assume that the law of non-contradiction is necessary, and this makes 
it the case that the negation of the law of non-contradiction will be m-unimaginable. If the negation 
of the law of non-contradiction is m-unimaginable, then no object of which that property is 
predicated will be m-imaginable. Just as above, if the law of non-contradiction were contingent then 
we could m-imagine its negation because we can m-imagine that contingent propositions fail to 
obtain. It is thus the necessity of the law of non-contradiction that allows us to block all imaginings 
of scenarios in which it fails to obtain from being m-imaginings.  
Given this reliance on a priori necessities, we might question what is actually allowing 
Gregory and Yablo to draw the correct modal conclusions when it comes down to the test cases. It 
                                               
31 Take again the proposition that “Barack Obama has a home library.” I do not know whether that proposition is true 
or false, but not knowing this does not prevent me from imagining that the proposition is true, nor does it prevent me 




may seem as though it is not what we imagine that is doing the bulk of the work, but rather some 
necessary a priori truths operating in the background that are. Since, the error theoretic accounts are 
the most promising, if those lines of reasoning turn out to succeed in virtue of relying on something 
other than our imaginings themselves, we might wonder whether we ought to consider the 
imagination as a modal epistemological tool at all.  
This conclusion is too hasty. We can grant that appealing to necessary a priori truths is doing 
the work in allowing us to draw the requisite modal conclusions in the test cases, but it does not 
follow that the imagination plays no role as a guide to those modal conclusions. While a priori 
necessities make it such that a proposition P takes on a certain modal status, it is picking out a 
modally salient sense of imagining and then trying to imagine P in that sense that gives us epistemic 
access to the work that the a priori necessities are doing. For example, that GC is necessary if true 
makes it such that GC is modally undecidable if unknown. However, we recognize that GC’s necessity 
if true makes it modally undecidable by recognizing that neither GC nor not-GC is m-imaginable. 
First, we have seen that without picking out a modally salient sense of imagining, we will not 
even recognize GC as modally undecidable because we will take ourselves to be able to imagine 
GC.32 If we just took fs-imaginability to be a guide to knowledge of possibilities, we would wrongly 
conclude that GC is possible. Second, it’s not the case that solely recognizing that GC is necessary if 
true (i.e. without trying to imagine GC in any sense) suffices for us to conclude that GC is modally 
undecidable. Recognizing that claim amounts to recognizing that either GC is the case in every 
possible world or there is no possible world in which GC is the case. However, after recognizing 
that claim we must then determine whether there is in fact a possible world in which GC is the case 
before we can form a modal conclusion about GC. We have already seen that one way to determine 
whether there is a possible world in which GC is the case to try to imagine a possible world in which 
                                               




GC is the case. As we have already seen, to imagine a possible world in which X is the case just is to 
m-imagine X on Yablo’s error theoretic account. Thus, we will not be justified in concluding that 
GC is modally undecidable just in virtue of the fact that GC is necessary if true. We must also 
determine whether there is a possible world in which GC is the case and we will need to employ the 
imagination in order to determine this. While I am not committed to this being the only means by 
which we can make that determination, I hold that it is one trustworthy means of doing so.  
Using the imagination to form beliefs about possibilities is plausibly as familiar to us as using 
perceptual faculties to form beliefs about actualities. While we take ourselves to have a grasp on how 
perceptual errors arise, our ignorance of the etiology of modal errors puts our modal conclusions on 
shakier footing. By establishing a tenable explanation of modal error, Gregory and Yablo each offer 
an error theoretic line of reasoning on which our imaginings can boost the epistemic status of those 
modal conclusions. They each explicate what allows us to find impossibilities m-imaginable, and in 
doing so give us reason to think that absent those defeaters, we will be justified in ascribing 
possibility to what we do find m-imaginable. Equipped with the ability to recognize modal error, we 
can continue go about the already habitual act of using our imaginings to form modal beliefs. We 
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